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I. PROLOGUE
After several years of struggling with the issues addressed in this
Article, I am revisiting and reconceptualizing them with the insights
and perspectives gained through the literature on the feminist/feminine views of morality and moral development. Through this reading
and thinking, I feel that I have been able to reconcile some of the difficult conflicts and problems that have troubled me. Principally, I feel
more comfortable with the realization that I do not, and I believe canCopyright held by the NEBRAsKA LAw REvIEw.
Clinical Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School. The Author is grateful for the
extensive work of research assistants Mari Majefski and Melissa Garren. She
would also like to thank her husband, Richard Eyster, for his comments and suggestions, and her secretary, Lorraine Joyce, for typing numerous drafts and other
invaluable assistance.
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not, provide a single formula for the law student and lawyer to follow
in order to achieve ethical and effective negotiation behavior. I now
believe that this cannot be done in a way that satisfies the feminine/
care ethic which has heretofore been subordinated in typical writings
and practices in the negotiation arena. The need for contextual decision making conflicts with the desire for uniformity. As I revisit my
concerns, and my methods for dealing with these concerns in my
teaching, I know that I have experienced the discomfort and dissonance identified by Carol Gilligan, in her portrayals of Amy, Hillary,
and Jakel as well as by other writers who have explored the alternative ethical voice-the Care Ethic.
I rely, in part, on the theories of Lawrence Kohlberg2 and others
who have advocated the teaching of moral judgment and decision
making throughout the years of formal education. Although many
feminist writers have criticized the methodologies of some of these
studies because of the complete absence of female subjects, I still believe that the theories about the effect of formal education on the de1.

CAROL GILLIGAN, IN

A

DIERENT VOICE-PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S

DEvELOPhMENT (1982). Amy is an eleven year old girl whom Gilligan uses to por-

tray the nature of a moral conflict for the developing female adolescent. She describes Amy's conflict as "the eleven-year old girl's question of whether or not to
listen to herself' in attempting to make a moral choice. Id. at 51. Hilary is a
twenty-seven year old lawyer who experiences tension between adhering to the
adversary system and assisting an opponent in discovering a document useful to
his client. Id. at 135. These, and other examples, demonstrate the tensions that
many lawyers might experience in the process of negotiating disputes. Jake, an
eleven year old boy, is used to demonstrate a different process of resolution of
moral conflict. Jake relies on applying rules to the situation, and then conforming his feelings to the outcome dictated by the rules. Id. at 49-50.
2. The theories and writings of Lawrence Kohlberg are very extensive, and I will not
attempt to catalogue them. Rather, I cite to a small sample, as well as to the
writings of others who more fully describe and discuss his work. LAWRENCE
KOHLBERG, EssAYs ON MORAL DEVELOPME: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVEL-

oPArrNT, at 575 n.15 (1984); 1 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPimT: THE PmLOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOP~mNT (1981); See Celia Modgil, eds.,

1986); Walter H. Bennett, Jr., Making Moral Lawyers: A Modest Proposal, 36
CATH. U. L. REv. 45, 46-48 & n.3 (1986); Steven Hartwell, PromotingMoral Development Through ExperientialTeaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 505, 506-12, (1995)

[hereinafter Hartwell, Experiential Teaching]; Steven Hartwell, Moral Development, Ethical Conduct,and ClinicalEducation,35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 131, 13341 passim (1990)[hereinafter Hartwell, Clinical Education]; James S. Leming,

Kohlbergian Programmes in Moral Education: A PracticalReview and Assessment, in LAWRENCE KOHLBauG: CONSENSUS AND CoNTRovERSY 245 (Sohan Modgil
& Celia Modgil, eds., 1986); David A. J. Richards, Moral Theory, The DevelopmentalPsychology of EthicalAutonomy and Professionalism,31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359,
364-73 (1981). Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning and development "posits
that as individuals mature, they pass through certain identifiable stages of moral
development." LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPzMNT 507-08 (1984). "Each stage of moral reasoning

moves progressively closer to an idealized concept of justice." Id. at 508.
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velopment of moral judgment are sound. The precise way in which
Kohlberg and others have measured and tested moral development
may be incomplete, and therefore flawed, but the notion that moral
reasoning can be nurtured and developed during and beyond the years
of formal education is, in my view, entirely consistent with the writings and practices of feminism. Phyllis Goldfarb writes of a "TheoryPractice Spiral" based on the fundamental precepts of both feminism
and clinical education. 3 She claims that our understanding of moral
and ethical action is necessarily informed and modified by the context
in which we see and judge that action. 4 This learning is, consequently,
not static nor capable of being reduced to simple formulas.
What follows is a description of some serious issues that arise in
the present practice surrounding negotiation-problems which I encountered in the practice and teaching of dispute resolution negotiation in a law school clinical program. I describe the methods of
teaching that I developed to attempt to deal with these problems, and
my perceptions about the shortcomings of my efforts. I am now more
comfortable with the realization that I cannot provide a simple prescription to resolve these issues. This is, in my view, all the more reason why we must teach our students a process of reasoning that allows
them to confront ethical problems in context and to resolve them.
Some of the teaching in this area has done generations of lawyers a
grave disservice; it has allowed them to conclude either that the answers are capable of simple resolution by application of clear rules to
facts or that there are no limits to a lawyer's conduct. As I will postulate below, the absence of any rules, coupled with an "ethos" that favors aggressive and even ruthless conduct, produces practices that
would be judged by most non-lawyers to be immoral.
I do not have empirical data to support my conclusion that my students learn from the process I describe here. I have not attempted to
verify my observations by administering the type of tests utilized by
Kohlberg and others.5 I realize the seeming inconsistency of accepting
the conclusions of Kohlberg while rejecting his methodology, but I
3. Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-PracticeSpiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical
Education, 75 M]-N. L. REv. 1599, 1650-51, 1653 (1991).
4. The author explains that it is only through repeated opportunities to make and to
act upon moral judgments that the student develops this skill. This process can
be guided by the teacher who is sensitive to the context in which the moral issue
arises. Id.
5. Kohlberg's theory provides the basis of testing instruments designed to appraise
the level of an individual's moral reasoning using the Defining Issues Test (DIT).
The DIT is a "pencil and paper instrument comprising six vignettes, each
presenting, a moral dilemma.... For each vignette subjects are asked to choose
among twelve possible moral reasons, those reasons they find most important in
resolving the dilemma. The DIT measures the degree to which the subject
chooses principled moral reasoning". Hartwell, Experiential Teaching, supra
note 2, at 512. Kohlberg himself used a slightly different testing method, based
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think that seeming inconsistency is merely the reflection of a difference in objectives. I am not as much concerned in measuring the ability to engage in sound moral reasoning as I am in teaching sound
moral behavior. I am not convinced that moral conduct and the ability
to respond "correctly" to a written hypothetical are necessarily co-extensive. This does not mean that testing is irrelevant. I think that
the testing demonstrates that teaching can have an impact on how
students analyze moral problems; they are able to be guided and influenced by formal teaching, even at an age when moral judgment was
once thought to be fully in place. It is my belief that by teaching and
modeling both the reasoning and the corresponding behavior, I can
help students to bridge the gap between theory and conduct.
Talking about ethics and moral issues is, in my view, not an adequate method for preparing students to behave ethically. As I discuss
below, I have noted a divergence between what students say in classroom discussions, and what they do, or propose to do, in real life situations. I do not suggest that the discussion of these issues serves no
purpose; merely that discussion alone is not sufficient. Similarly, testing student development through a written test is insufficient. I have
observed that my students develop a better understanding and facility
for moral decision making and ethical conduct through the program I
describe.
As others have written, it is still not clear how, or even whether,
the influx of women and minorities into the profession will transform
practice and ethical norms. 6 I feel, however, that unless we discard
the lessons and practices that have stifled our growth as a profession,
neither we nor our students can fully realize the potential. As a
clinical professor, and as a woman, I am now more comfortable with
the notion that we must feel our way into and through this
transformation.
II. INTRODUCTION
The theme of this Article is that we must begin to focus our legal
educational efforts on moral character as well as technical skills if we
are to improve the overall ethical conduct of the profession. By teachon interviewing subjects. Subjects may score higher on the written test (DIT)
because they need only recognize the response, rather than create it. Id. at n.31.
6. See Naomi R. Cahn, A PreliminaryFeminist Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETmcs 23 (1990); Minna Kotkin, Professionalism,Gender and the Public
Interest:The Advocacy ofProtection,8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 157 (1995); Isabel Marcus et al., The 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Feminist Discourse,
Moral Values, and the Law.A Conversation,34 BuFF. L. REv. 11 (1985) [hereinafter Feminist Discourse]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia In A Different Voice:
Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WoimN's L. J. 39
(1985).
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ing our students that to "think like a lawyer" is to focus on rules only,
and to screen out other concerns, we are thwarting the development of
their full moral potential. One of the starkest demonstrations of the
failure of a rules orientation in teaching law, and especially legal ethics, arises in the teaching and practice of negotiation, particularly the
negotiated settlement of lawsuits.7 Although commentators, practitioners, and educators have engaged in a wide variety of analyses, rationalizations, and other efforts to articulate a rule based ethic for
negotiation, 8 these efforts have been unsuccessful and unsatisfying. 9
I believe that the reasons we have been unsuccessful in achieving a
satisfactory negotiation ethic go to the heart of our system of legal
7. Although my focus is on the ethics and practice of negotiation, the failure of our
educational regime in terms of producing moral and ethical professionals is not so
limited. Professor Himmelstein wrote a powerful critique of our teaching methodologies almost 20 years ago. Jack Himmelstein, Researching Law Schooling:
An Inquiry Into The Application of Humanistic EducationalPsychology To The
Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 514 (1978). More recently, feminist writers
and others have explicitly or implicitly criticized the narrow focus of legal education, particularly as it focuses on teaching students to divorce analysis of rules
from other concerns. See Cahn, supranote 6, at 25-35 passim; Hartwell, Clinical
Education, supra note 2, at 131-33 passim; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, TowardAnother View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L.
REv. 754, 817-29 (1984) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Problem Solving]; Richards, supra note 2, at 361.
8. Commentators have taken varied approaches in an effort to articulate a rulebased ethic for negotiation. For example, Naomi Cahn suggests adding two sections to the Model Rules. One would recognize that the attorney's personal morality may conflict with her professional judgment. The other would require the
attorney to analyze this conflict and to disclose it to the client. Professor Cahn
argues that this would enable us to preserve the current system while paving the
way to consideration of alternative forms of dispute resolutions. Calm, supra
note 6, at 49-50. Similarly, Walter Steele, Jr., proposes the addition of a rule
which would impose on negotiators an "obligation of total candor and total cooperation to the extent required to insure that the result is fair." Walter W. Steele,
Jr., Deceptive Negotiatingand High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1387, 1403
(1986). In contrast, Rex Perschbacher suggests that there are currently existing
regulatory rules of conduct which can provide guidance for ethical behavior in
negotiations. Perschbacher would extrapolate a standard of conduct for negotiators from statutes, decisions, administrative regulations, etc. existing in other
fields of law such as contract, tort, agency, and malpractice. Rex R.
Perschbacher, RegulatingLawyers'Negotiations,27 ARiz. L. REv. 75 (1985). Gerald Wetlaufer acknowledges that lying in negotiations is both routine and an effective tactic. However, he also supports the delineation of clearer lines between
acceptable and unacceptable behavior in addition to making room for ethics to
enter into the negotiation process. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in
Negotiations, 75 IowA L. Rev. 1219 (1990). See also PAUL MICHAEL LISNEK, A
LAwYER'S GUIDE TO EFFEcTIVE NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION (CLE, 1993)(sug
gesting rules that are principally descriptive, rather than prescriptive); Scott S.
Dahl, Ethics On The Table: Stretching The Truth in Negotiations, 8 Rev. LrrIG.
173, 174-80 (1989)(summarizing the main viewpoints on the issues of truthfulness in negotiation); Thomas F. Guernsey, Truthfulness In Negotiation, 17 U.
Ricm. L. Rev. 99 (1982).
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education and our related beliefs about professionalism. Only by making fundamental changes in the way we view our professional roles,
and in the way we educate our professionals, can we achieve a satisfactory solution to the presently intractable dilemmas posed by common negotiation practice. I do not think that the problems of
developing a satisfactory ethic of legal professionalism begin and end
with negotiation; I think, instead, that the tensions which arise in the
teaching and practice of negotiation are an important indicator of the
extent of our failure to adequately incorporate the notion of moral
judgmentO in our standards of professional responsibility.
Negotiation practice provides an excellent laboratory for considering these issues for a number of reasons. First, a significant percentage of our litigated disputes are resolved through some form of
negotiation."1 Second, for a variety of structural reasons, the negotia9. See notes 86-88, infra, and accompanying text, for a discussion of the conclusion
that we have been unsuccessful in developing a satisfactory set of ethical rules to
govern negotiation.
10. See James R. Elkins, Moral Discourse and Legalism in Legal Education, 32 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1982). Professor Elkins decries the persistent and traditional
segregation of moral discourse from law teaching, even in the area of Professional
Responsibility. He explains this as a function of the culture of legal education
which values rules analysis, and devalues other perspectives. Id. at 11-19. He
states that students come to expect courses, including courses on ethics, to teach
rules, analysis, and substantive law "as if it had no moral content or import." Id.
at 30. "Students come to any values-oriented course with expectations derived
from the law school culture. In this case the student subculture treats valuescourses as if they were not 'real' law courses." Id. It may be difficult to articulate
a definition of moral judgment that would accurately describe varying ideas as to
what it entails. Richards draws on both Kohlberg and Jean Piaget in stating that
"moral development is viewed in terms of the kinds of reasonsoffered by people at
various ages for believing or thinking acts to be wrong and right and acting on
these perceptions." Richards, supra note 2, at 365. Walter Bennett defines the
term "moral" in three related ways: the general considerations between right and
wrong, the societal mores or norms that govern right and wrong; and individual
perceptions and emotions. Bennett, supra note 2, at 45-46. Carol Gilligan states
that "[tihe essence of moral decision is the exercise of choice and the willingness
to accept responsibility for that choice." Gilligan, supra note 1, at 67. She explains that "fw]omen's construction of the moral problem as a problem of care and
responsibility in relationships rather than as one of rights and rules ties the development of their moral thinking to changes in their understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as justice ties
development to the logic of equality and reciprocity." Id. at 73. My use of the
terms "moral," "morality," and "moral judgment" throughout this Article is an
admittedly imprecise mixture of these various concepts.
11. Commentators, statistics, and common perception indicate that well over 50% of
civil cases end in a negotiated settlement while fewer than 10% are tried to a
verdict. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About OurAllegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 27-28 (1983); Richard D. Mink, An Attorney's
Responsibilityfor His Client's Reputation and Self-Esteem in the Settlement Context, J. LEGAL PROF. 191 (1987); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bar-
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tion process lends itself to unethical and unscrupulous conduct.
Third, and perhaps most important, legal scholars and commentators
do not even agree on whether certain practices are, or should be, prohibited.12 Based on my own efforts to resolve the dilemmas that I feel
are inherent in current negotiation practices, and from my reading of
others' proposals, suggestions, and analyses, I have reached the conclusion that satisfactory reform is unlikely to be achieved solely
through new rules formulated by the legal profession. Until we educate our students in a manner that makes moral judgment a legitimate and central feature of professional conduct, I think we will not
gaining in the Shadow of the Laws: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951
nn.2 & 3 (1979); Perschbacher, supra note 8, at 75, n.2.; David M. Trubek & Austin Sarat, The Costs of OrdinaryLitigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 85-87 (1983).
12. Even a seemingly straightforward issue such as the role of lying in the negotiation process does not receive universal condemnation. Some commentators would
agree with the position taken by Professor James White: "To conceal one's true
position, to mislead an opponent about one's true settling point, is the essence of
negotiation." James J. White, Machiavelli and The Bar: Ethical Limitations on
Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 928 (1980). See, e.g.,
Guernsey, supranote 8, at 125. Charles Curtis has advanced this viewpoint most
forcefully in claiming that one of the lawyer's legitimate functions may be to lie
for the client, and to otherwise act in ways that neither the lawyer nor the client
would do on his own. Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics ofAdvocacy, 4 STAN L. REv. 3,
6, 9 (1951).
Others are at least partially aligned with Judge Rubin who has called for an
enhanced standard of candor: '[Tlhe Profession should embrace an affirmative
ethical standard for attorneys' professional relationships with courts, other lawyers and the public: The lawyer must act honestly and in good faith." Alvin B.
Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA L. REv. 577, 589
(1975). See, e.g., Steele, supra note 8.
A more obviously complex matter like the duty of the attorney to disclose unfavorable facts and legal authority to her adversary has inspired extensive discourse. See GARY BELLOw & BEA MOULTON,

THE LAwYERING PROCESS,

586-606

(1978); Dahl, supra note 8, passim; Guernsey, supra note 8, 113-20. Other kinds
of misrepresentations, such as the use of false demands, the denial of settlement
authority, and the pretense of an uncooperative or unreasonable client may be
advocated or discussed without any reference to the attorney's ethical duty. See
e.g., KENEY F. HEGLAND, TRIAL PRACTMCE SKILLS IN A NUTSHELL, at 295 (1978);
Michael Pickering, The Art of Settlement Negotiations, 62 LAw INsrr. J. 31, 33-35
(1988).
Other articles which illustrate the type of conduct and which highlight the
significant differences in view as to what the few applicable rules require or allow
include: AimEicAN LAWYERS CODE OF CONDUCT, Preface (May, 1982); J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS, 126-32 (1983); Monroe H. Freedman, Are the
Model Rules Unconstitutional?35 U. MLIim L. REv. 685 (1980-81); Donald G. Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context, 34 UCLA L. REv. 811, 815,
823-29 (1987); W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, The
Kutak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly,Three Peas in a Pod, 35
U. MiAn L. REv. 739 passim (July 1981).
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be able to achieve a standard of negotiation practice that would satisfy
Amy and Hilary, and probably not Jake.13
In Part III of this Article, I discuss the reasons why I believe that it
is both important and difficult to teach law students the process of
negotiation and how to conduct themselves in the process. I describe
the structural and ethical problems and why they are so seemingly
intractable. I then describe the curriculum which I have developed to
enable students to enter their professional careers with an effective
and ethical approach to negotiation; and I explain why these efforts
have not been entirely satisfactory.
In Part IV, I explain why I think that the difficulties which I have
identified cannot be resolved merely through rewriting the rules. I
describe the obstacles in the drafting of the current ABA Model Rules
that blocked the passage of rules of conduct which would have required lawyers to act honestly in their negotiations. Further, I postulate that it is the underlying ethos of the profession, the way we
perceive our roles, which inhibits us from requiring a higher standard
of conduct of our profession.
Finally, in Part V, I attempt to make the case for a different approach to legal education, and a different view of the role of the profession; a view that derives from the work of moral psychologists, as well
as from the writings of feminists and other legal scholars. I rely on
the writings of these scholars to suggest ways in which we might view
our roles as educators and as professionals which differ from the currently prevailing viewpoint. In addition, I explore the application of
these ideas to legal education generally, and to the problems of negotiation in particular.
III. THE CHALLENGE OF TEACHING EFFECTIVE AND
ETHICAL NEGOTIATION PRACTICES
My experiences as a clinical teacher have convinced me that students feel more apprehensive about negotiation than they do about
almost any other lawyering task. The absence of rules and models
creates an aura of mystery and uncertainty which needs to be dispelled. 14 Many students express reluctance to raise the issue of settle13. See supra note 1.
14. There is substantial agreement among commentators that the area of negotiation
lacks specific and clear rules of procedure and of ethics. See, e.g. Calm, supra
note 6; Dahl, supra note 8; Gifford, supra note 12; Menkel-Meadow, Problem
Solving, supra note 7; Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargainingand the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493 (1989); Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use ofLies in Negotiation, 48 OHmo ST. L.J. 1, 2, 9, 13 (1987). Cf William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion
in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083, 1084-90 (1988). Whether there is a need
to fill this void and, if so, how to begin to do so are questions that have led to
much debate.
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ment with an adversary; they fear it is a sign of weakness. Some treat
the negotiation process much like oral argument, not surprisingly
since that is one oral skill which is stressed in the curriculum. Accordingly, they seek to reach "agreement" by persuading the adversary of
the correctness of their position. They listen only in order to refute,
and when they do not succeed in this endeavor, they assume that compromise is hopeless. More importantly, unless "ethics" has been highlighted as the topic of the class, students engaged in mock
negotiations often overlook the serious ethical issues raised by the
problem.
In summary, having observed students' approaches to the ethical
and practical issues presented by settlement negotiation, I am convinced that they must be afforded opportunities during law school to
learn how to negotiate effectively and ethically. I am also becoming
increasingly convinced that, in order to accomplish this dual objective,
it is necessary to challenge, and perhaps to defy, some of the prevailing wisdom concerning the limits of ethical conduct. As detailed more
fully below, efforts to achieve these goals within the current system
are not wholly satisfactory.
It is widely perceived that the negotiated settlement of legal disputes accounts for the vast majority of dispute resolutions. Statistics
support this view, but they do not reveal the full picture. 15 Pre-litigation settlements are difficult to tally accurately. There are also postverdict, pre-appeal settlements that may not be counted as negotiated
resolutions. Personal experience as well as statistics indicate the critical importance of negotiation in the dispute resolution process.
In view of the obvious significance of the settlement process to the
overall litigation picture, it seems clear that lawyers should be given
some introduction to, and training in, the process of negotiating settlements. It also seems somewhat remarkable that there are few rules of
ethics or procedure that directly address the negotiation process. 16
15. See Norton, supra note 14, at 496 n.13, 497 n.15; Trubek & Sarat, supra note 11,
at 85-87.
16. In fact, the rules of the Code are not specific to the negotiation process at all. In
the ABA Model Rules, none of the rules is specific to negotiations with the exception of Rule 1.2(a) which requires the lawyer to "abide by the client's decision
whether to accept an offer of settlement . . . ." Negotiation is referred to in the
comments of a few of the rules. For example, the comments to Rule 1.7, pertaining to conflicts of interest, discuss the difficulty of assessing conflicts of interest in
contexts other than litigation. The proposition is illustrated with a reference to
negotiations: "For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in
interest even though there is some difference of interest among them." MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFEssIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1983). Rule 4.1 forbids a lawyer
to knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person.
Comment 2 following the rule states that
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Because of the vagaries of the process, the student and the novice
attorney are particularly vulnerable, and are often unprepared to respond either effectively or ethically to the pressures of negotiation. In
the absence of any concrete guidance on ethics or procedure, practi17
tioners rely heavily on experience, common sense, and instinct.
The factors which make negotiation difficult to the novice practitioner also make it a difficult subject to teach. The difficulty lies not in
the teaching of negotiation skills, per se, but rather in achieving a satisfactory set of principles that yield both ethical and effective negotiation conduct. A thorough examination of both the literature and the
actual experience of negotiation practice may lead to an unhappy conclusion: the better one becomes at concealment and deceit, the more
successful one will be at achieving favorable results for the client.1s
[t]his Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement

should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances.
Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of
statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a
party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this
category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where
nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 4.13 cmt. (1983).
17. There have been several attempts at prescribing a model for successful negotiating, and these can be quite helpful to both the novice and the experienced negotiator. Nonetheless, even these models often leave questions unanswered, or
acknowledge that there are no definite answers to the intractable ethical dilemmas. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES (2d ed. 1991); ROGER FISHER &
WIahIt URY, GEI'rNG To YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WrrHoUT GIVING IN
(1981)[hereinafter FISHER & URY, GETTING TO YES]; Gifford, supra note 12;

Guernsey, supra note 8; Eve Hill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in a Feminine
Voice, 5 OMO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 337 (1990); Menkel-Meadow, Problem Solving, supra note 7; Norton, supra note 14.
18. This was illustrated by Scott Dahl's interview of 14 Texas attorneys, representing
diverse civil practice areas of private law firms. After integrating their responses
to hypothetical questions exploring various ethical aspects of negotiations Dahl
concluded that a "client first" attitude is strongly entrenched in the legal profession. Most of the interviewees were untroubled by the idea of misleading the
other side, viewing it as "part of the 'game' of negotiation." Dahl, supra note 8, at
199. Many of them apparently "agree on the boundary of permissible deceit,
which in turn shows that these lawyers are not 'hunting for the rules of the game
as it is (being) played' but rather they are following what they view as permissible conventions of untruthfulness in negotiations." Id. (footnote omitted). See
Guernsey, supra note 8; Norton, supra note 14; Wetlaufer, supra note 8, passim
(the author condemns the various practices that he catalogs, but his extensive list
of deceptive tactics and justifications demonstrates the prevalence of these practices); White, supra note 12. Robert Condlin examines the tension between the
ethical and practical demands of negotiation from a slightly different perspective
in Bargainingin the Dark, 51 MD. L. REv. 1 (1992). He argues that in the long
term cooperative bargaining is more practical and effective, but that this practical norm conflicts with the perception of the ethical norm embodied in the zealous
advocacy principle. Id. See discussion infra Part IV.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:752

The same tension does exist, to some degree, throughout the adversary process. 1 9 However, there are features of the negotiation process
that make this tension particularly acute. Although the problem may
initially be seen as a failure to prescribe sufficient rules, I believe that
the problem is more fundamental. As will be discussed below, the
structural features of the negotiation process, coupled with the lack of
a uniform ethic of fairness and honesty, contribute to an inherently
conflicted practice. The mixed message that is being communicated
seems to be: learn to do all the things that will trick your adversary
into under/over-valuing the case, but do it in a way which avoids outright lying about material facts or the law.20 This is a difficult and
unsatisfying lesson for the professional to adopt, and for the educator
to teach.
A. Uncharted Waters, Unguided Practices
The structural features of negotiation that make it particularly
susceptible to ethical dilemmas are the following: 1) negotiation is a
largely invisible, undocumented, and unreviewable process; 21 2) nego19. See Guernsey, supra note 8, at 99 (discussing the tension between advocacy and
honesty as applied generally to the practice of law). The basis of the tension
arises from Canon 7 of the ABA Model Code that requires that "[a] lawyer...
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILrrY Cannon 7 (1980). Gerald Williams explains that there
is no separate body of law that pertains to negotiation-rather it is viewed as an
adjunct of litigation. GERALD WILIAms, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEENT, 90
(1983).
20. See Guernsey, supra note 8, 105-120; Hegland, supra note 12, at 289, 295; Norton, supra note 14, passim; White, supra note 12, at 928 and passim. But cf.
Menkel-Meadow, Problem Solving, supra note 7. Menkel-Meadow advocates another view of negotiating that would require more openness and honesty to maximize mutual gain. The problem solving strategy that she describes, which is
supported by an economic analysis, would require more open disclosure and information sharing in order to achieve maximum mutual gain. Id. at 822-23. This
is a model that has not yet, to my knowledge, received wide-spread acceptance,
although it may be growing in popularity. See Condlin, supra note 18, at 11-68.
21. See Norton, supra note 14, passim. Cf Gifford, supra note 12; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 11, passim (describing the interrelationship between the formal, adjudicatory model and the "private ordering" negotiating process). While
the experienced negotiator can use this freedom effectively to gain information, to
make selective revelations, and to discover weaknesses, the novice may be confused or misled by the process. See, e.g., Bellow & Moulton, supra note 12, at 50822. Cf Peters, supra note 14, at 49. Second, negotiations are usually conducted
privately. White, supra note 12, at 926. Cf Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 637, 640 (1976) (describing the negotiation process through case histories
from an African society because of the paucity of such accounts in our own culture). This means that students will have had little opportunity to observe lawyers negotiating. In the absence of relevant models students are most apt to
assume the lawyer's role with which they are most familiar-either the trial or
appellate advocate. Neither of these roles is well suited to effective negotiating.
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tiation is a wholly informal process ungoverned by any codified procedural rules;2 2 and 3) negotiation practices are not specially addressed,
except in the most general way, by either the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct or the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 23 These features seem to contribute to the prevalence of practices that, by generally accepted standards of conduct, would be
judged dishonest.
The "invisibility" of the negotiation process is well known and has
been discussed by many commentators. 24 In many, perhaps most, negotiations there is no judge present. The clients may at times be present, although this is not the customary practice and is not required in
most cases. The issue of what attorneys tell their clients about the
process, both before and after, is an open question; it can safely be
stated that clients do not always know what transpired in the actual
25
negotiation session.
For most individual litigants there is no access to "market" information on settlements. Clients are, of course, informed of the outcome
of the negotiations because the decision whether or not to settle is one
the client must make. 26 However, even the outcomes are somewhat
"invisible" in the sense that the terms of settlement agreements are
Although the reliance on legal authority or other norms, and a certain amount of
"argument" concerning both facts and law are useful negotiation tactics, the absence of a final arbiter makes these models flawed. However, for an interesting
perspective on the role of norms and principles in negotiation see id.
22. The complexity of the process of settlement negotiation, and its interrelationship

with other aspects of the lawyering process, has been detailed and analyzed by
Prof. Donald G. Gifford. Gifford, supra note 12. Clearly a process this complex

cannot be reduced to definitive rules. However, the trial process, including jury
selection, opening statements, witness examination, etc., is no less complex.
Nonetheless, there is a set of rules that serves as the basic framework for the
process. Negotiation lacks even this sort of uniform framework Of course, it
could be argued that rules of procedure govern pre-trial and trial practice in only
the most skeletal fashion. Strategy and tactics, rather than adherence to the
rules, make the lawyer a skilled, successful litigator. However, even the novice
can, by following the rules, know when and how to get into the game and what
steps to follow toward completion. The negotiation game is far less accessible.
23. See supra note 16.
24. See supra note 21.
25. It may be seen as acceptable for lawyers to deceive their clients, depending on the
statement and the circumstances. See In re Mal De Mer Fisheries, Inc., 884 F.
Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1995). Under generally accepted conventions in negotiations,

certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material
fact and, therefore, lawyers may feel that it is permissible to misrepresent those
facts. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients 138 U. PA. L. Rav. 659, 734 (1990). See
also, Dahl,supra note 8, at 184-85. Cf Gifford, supra note 12, at 839-43 (discussing the problem of lawyer dominance of negotiation counseling).
26. Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.2 (a) states: "A lawyer shall abide by

a client's

decisions concerning the objectives of representation....

(d) A lawyer

shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a
matter." MODEL RuLEs OF PRoFEssIoNAL CoNDucT Rule 1.2 (1983).
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generally not publicly known and may be kept confidential.27 Consequently, a client may be informed that an insurer will pay $5,000 for
her broken wrist, but she will not necessarily know what other settlements were reached for other plaintiffs' broken wrists. She may be
able to learn what juries awarded for similar injuries and some settlements are reported, but access to this type of information is not universal. This makes it virtually impossible for the client to judge
whether the outcome of the negotiation in her case was a "fair" one. In
most cases, there is no requirement that the result be approved by a
court, even when the court is informed of the terms of the
settlement.28

Compounding the problem of invisibility is the lack of procedural
guidelines to govern the process. Even the basic framework of the negotiation process, including when and how to begin negotiations, how
to respond to offers or demands, when to conclude negotiations, and
how to finalize agreements, may be unknown to the novice. 2 9 Contrasted with, for example, pre-trial and trial procedures,30 no structural rules are available to the novice attorney to guide her in
negotiating. Unlike pleadings and discovery requests, there is no set
The ABA Model Code's Ethical Considerations also bear on this issue. Ethical
Consideration 7-7 allows a lawyer to make decisions on her own in certain circumstances that do not affect the merits of the case, "[b]ut otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client...." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiSILITY EC 7-7 (1980).
Ethical Consideration 7-8 states that a lawyer should advise a client of the
possible effect of each legal alternative; however, "the lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILxrY

EC 7-8 (1980).

27. See, e.g., Hegland, supra note 12, at 279-88, 300-01 (discussion of the difficulty of
evaluation of the case's worth). See also Gifford, supra note 12 at 830-31 (discussion of the difficulty of assessing the settlement prospects of case before the negotiation begins).
28. FED R. Civ. P. 23(e). The absence of any defined structure or limitations on the
process of settlement of most civil cases is not clearly desirable or necessary. A
cogent argument can be made for requiring some type of judicial input and approval once the disputants have invoked the power and authority of the court by
bring the matter to litigation. To a greater or lesser extent, the settlement of
certain categories of civil lawsuits already requires some judicial oversight. See,
e.g., Mnookin, supra note 11.
29. There are, of course, numerous articles, studies, and how-to-pieces written for the
practitioner. These serve essentially the same function as pieces written on the
art of cross examination, jury selection, and oral advocacy. They are not
grounded, however, in specific rules of practice or ethics. Rather, they are efforts
to describe what lawyers do in negotiating, what is effective, and what pitfalls to
avoid. See supra note 17.
30. Trial and pre-trial conduct is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence as well
as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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time or manner to embark on settlement discussions.31

765
Of course,

there have been numerous articles, treatises, and books written on negotiation practice which offer valuable insights and guidelines.32 I
distinguish between these works and rules because descriptive works,
while useful, lack the authority and enforceability of prescriptive
rules. Thus, the settlement negotiation process is lacking the structural features that would help insure the integrity of the process; publicity, an impartial arbiter, accountability, and procedural
guidelines.33
Absent structural guarantees of regularity and fairness, the integrity of the negotiation process might be safeguarded by clear and enforceable rules proscribing unethical practices. Such rules do not
presently exist. The two principal sources of ethical guidance are the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility34 [hereinafter "Code"]
and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct [hereinafter "Model
Rules"]. 35 The provisions of the Code and the Model Rules are not
specific to the negotiation process.3 6 Thus, rules pertaining to misrepresentation of law and fact, concealment of witnesses and evidence,
and expression of personal opinions were not tailored to the negotiation process. 3 7
There is a wide range of opinion as to how these rules apply, what
types of practices are proscribed, and what types are accepted. Various types of misrepresentations, such as lying about the client's willingness to settle, making false demands, and misrepresenting the
dollar amount acceptable to a client are among the practices that may
be criticized or applauded depending on the commentators interpretation of what ethical representation under the rules requires.3 8 Fre31. As noted by some commentators, without this guidance some attorneys are reluctant to even begin the negotiation process for fear of making a mistake in valuing
the case. MURRAY & RAu r AL., PROCESSES OF DIsPuTE RESOLUTION, 14041 (2d
ed. 1996).
32. See supra note 17.
33. The concept of "due process" is generally understood to include features of the
following types: rules of procedure, an impartial decision maker and fact finder,
reviewability, and, often, openness of the proceedings.
34. The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility was first adopted in 1969 and
served as the basis for the Codes of Ethics of many states, including New York.
35. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted in 1983 after extensive debate as a newer, more updated statement of the aspirational rules that
should govern the lawyer's work. The Model Rules have now been adopted, or
serve as the basis for the codes, in about half of the states. However, many states
still use the Model Code.
36. See supra notes 12 and 16.
37. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(3), DR 7102 (A)(5), DR 7-102(A)(7), DR 7-109(A), EC 1-5 and 7-9 (1980); MODEL RULES OF
PROFEssIONAL CoNDucT Rules 1.2(d), 1.6, 4.1 and 4.4 (1983).
38. See supranote 12. Gerald Wetlaufer gives a very thorough account of the types of
deceptive practices that may be used in negotiation and explores the usual ratio-
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quently, commentators who support the use of tactics that the
layperson would call deceitful do so from a sense of obligation. That
is, the dictates of our adversary system, and especially Cannon 7 (zealous advocacy), require the most aggressive conduct permitted by the
rules. 3 9 In the absence of clear prohibitions, deceit of the kind described above may be seen as a requirement of zealous advocacy.
The extent to which the variety of deceitful behavior is accepted is
apparent when one reviews textbooks and treatises on the negotiation
process. Authors nearly always describe a range of practices that are
designed, in some measure, to deceive the opponent. 4o Very rarely are
deceitful practices condemned outright. Frequently, a separate section on "ethics" advises the reader to avoid material misrepresentations. 4 1 The practices described in the "tactics" chapters are not
clearly within the proscription. In fact, some commentators utilize an
apparently circular logic to defend the various deceitful practices common in the negotiation process: these misrepresentations are not unethical because they are an acceptable part of the process. A variation
of this reasoning is: these are not material misrepresentations pronalizations and justifications. Wetlaufer, supra note 8, at 1224-26. The most
common types of deceptive practices include: bluffing (making demands or statements that are not serious, such as stating that a particular item must be agreed
to); puffing (exaggerating the value of the case or some aspect of the proof); making false demands; concealing settlement authority or the "bottom line;" and misstating the client's willingness to settle or to try the case. Other types of
deceptive practices, such as misrepresenting a material fact, such as the fact that
the plaintiff has died, are less common, and less often defended as essential to the
process. See Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp.
507 (E.D. Mich. 1983)(voiding settlement); see also Dahl, supra note 8.
39. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmiITY CANNON 7 (1980) requires zealous

advocacy within the bounds of the law which has been interpreted as requiring
the lawyer to go to the limit of what is legally permissible in advocating for the
client. See Curtis, supra note 12; supra note 19. The Model Rules have a somewhat modified requirement. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.3
cmt. (1983).
40. I do not intend to criticize the works I cite here; I use them merely as examples of
the tension that is prominent in this area. Two somewhat recent works, in which
the authors demonstrate sensitivity to the ethical dilemmas, still stop short of
outright condemnation. Paul Michael Lisnek writes of the need for the effective
negotiator to limit the exchange of information (which is often accomplished by
misrepresentation) even though he acknowledges that the "cooperative" negotiator will have difficulty utilizing these tactics. Lisnek, supra note 8, at 66. Another recent text states that "most lawyers know that it is accepted practice to
obscure-even to misrepresent-the bottom line in a negotiation." MURRAY, ET
AL., supranote 31, at 96. These two books, and numerous earlier works that were

less sensitive to the ethical issues, treat the "tactics" of negotiating as a separate
matter from the ethics. See Menkel-Meadow, Problem Solving, supra note 7, at
759.
41. MuRRAY, ET AL., supra note 31; Lisnek, supra note 8.
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scribed by the Code because the participants know that these matters
are frequently misrepresented. 4 2
B. Clinical Teaching of Negotiation Practice and Ethics
The process and ethics of negotiation can be very effectively studied in the context of a litigation clinic. In its broadest sense, negotiation takes place each time a student intern seeks additional time from
the adversary to prepare a litigation document or attempts to schedule a convenient time for deposing a witness. Even in the more restricted sense-negotiation of a settlement-the civil litigation clinic
mirrors the experience of practitioners everywhere; a majority of the
cases that are not decided by motion will be resolved through settlement. The issues that students confront in these cases include both
ethical and practical problems. Frequently, the two are so interrelated that there is no meaningful way to separate them. As in all facets of the clinical experience, the problems arise in a detailed,
realistic, and complex context. The lessons that can be learned from
this experience are, I believe, more meaningful and more memorable
than the discussions in a traditional classroom setting. Indeed, as I
have learned from my teaching efforts, the ideals expressed in the
classroom discussion, particularly concerning ethical dilemmas, are
too often forgotten in the fray of actual practice.
The negotiation curriculum that I have used is multi-faceted. It
includes readings on practice and ethics; class discussions; videotaped role-playing and critique; observations of actual negotiations;
and preparation for participation in settlement negotiations in the
student's own cases.
The first components of this process can occur together, as they are
somewhat complementary. I assign various readings on negotiation
theory and practice, including descriptions of various strategies and
approaches such as zero-sum bargaining and problem solving.43 The
merits and disadvantages of the various theories are discussed in the
classroom, and may be enacted in brief role playing. The application
42. "MThe language of DR 1-102(A)(4) (or Model Rule 4.1) is very clear--do not misrepresent. Yet, most lawyers know that it is accepted practice to obscure-even to
misrepresent-the bottom line in a negotiation. The Model Code and Model
Rules therefore probably do not intend to prohibit all misrepresentation." MURRAY & RAU, E'r AL., supranote 31, at 96. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDucr Rule 4.1 cmt (1983).
43. In past years I used a variety of texts and material in this segment of the course.
For example, students might be assigned readings in FISHER & URY, supra note
17; STEPHEN GILLERs & NORMAN DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAwYERs: PROBLEMS OF
LAw AND ETHics (1985); ROGER S. HAYDOCiK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL
LITGATION (2d ed. 1992); MAUET, PRETIAL (3d ed. 1995); Bellow & Moulton,
supra note 12; as well as various provisions of the ABA Model Code and Model
Rules.
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of the Code to dilemmas that may arise in the negotiation process is
discussed together with technique.
The class discussion proceeds from the readings to some more
nearly real-life situations presented by the role-playing and video-tape
presentations. In a simulated negotiation, students are given the opportunity to assume the roles of adversaries seeking to resolve a matter prior to litigation. Although role-playing lacks some of the energy
of a live dispute, students do usually assume the advocate's role more
effectively than they do in non-role class discussions. To facilitate the
adoption of their roles, I have sometimes asked students to role play
the settlement discussions in their actual cases. One student will be
assigned to play the role of her opponent in the real case while the
other student will adopt the role she actually plays in the real case.
This gives the simulation more texture and interest than a totally hypothetical problem. I often intentionally assign the student who is
most dismissive of the adversary's case to represent that party, in order to increase the incentive for that student to re-evaluate the case.
In these simulations the performance is videotaped out of the
classroom for a number of reasons. The negotiation between two individuals in an office is more realistic than a performance before an entire class. Audience feed-back (in the classroom) may affect the
process in an unrealistic manner. Also, the videotaped performance
can be edited for more effective class presentations; often repetitive
and unhelpful material must be deleted in the interest of time. Finally, the tape provides a record that is an important tool for the students. The videotape allows both student and supervisor to review
and analyze the performance-to highlight both strengths and weaknesses. Students are often surprised to see their performance on tape;
frequently it felt different at the time than it looked on tape. Specific
questions about the process-about what was said, who made concessions, who dominated the discussion, body-language, etc., can be answered with reference to the tape. Without this type of record, no
after-the-fact account is really reliable or accurate. 44
44. I do not mean to suggest that the student will give a dishonest account. However,
my experience is that reports by the participants of what transpired are often
inaccurate. In addition, the young attorney may be reluctant to admit to her
supervisor any conduct that she considers questionable. Interesting insights into
the effects of audiences, both actually present and "psychologically present," on
the conduct of negotiators are provided in a book entitled THE SOCIL PsYcHoLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION. The authors note that audience feedback

plays an important role in determining the way in which negotiators behave.
JEFFREY Z. RuBin & BERT R. BROWN, Tha SOCILL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING

AND NEGOTIATION 44-64 (1975). In particular, "positive evaluation and accountability pressures are likely to be particularly intense when a bargainer represents
others who are dependent on him." Id. at 48. Further, the pressure generated by
this type of audience is toward "advocacy of their preferred positions." Id. at 50-
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A slightly different perspective on the negotiation process is provided by students' observations of lawyers engaged in actual settlement discussions.45 Students are given the defendant's case abstract,
which briefly details the factual and legal issues as well as the probable liability and level of damages. They also sometimes observe the
prior discussion between the client and the attorney, as well as the
actual settlement discussions with opposing counsel. Typically, they
also have the opportunity to discuss the negotiation with the defense
attorney afterwards. Watching the process with full access to the information available to one side gives the student the chance to think
about the process both as an advocate and as an impartial observer.
After observing several discussions, the students are required to record their observations and to critique the performance they observed. 4 6 These exercises permit them to see how problems arise and
how they are resolved, and to judge the effectiveness and propriety of
a whole range of techniques.
The use of simulation is helpful to assist the students in connecting
theory and practice. Similarly, allowing students to observe and to
critique the performance of attorneys engaged in actual settlement
discussions helps to provide this link. The simulated role playing and
the negotiation observation activities provide somewhat detached, but
still realistic, vehicles for discussion of the relationship between theory and practice. 4 7 These two activities give the student a low-risk
opportunity to engage in, observe, and critique the process. The videotaped record of the student's negotiation role-play provides the supervisor with a full picture of the performances, unaffected by the
supervisor's participation.
51, 54. On the other hand, the party neutral as to the outcome of the bargaining
may facilitate fair and norm-bound conduct. Id. at 55, 60-61.
45. The civil litigation clinic that was the basis for the curriculum I describe was
offered at Brooklyn Law School through an affiliation with a government agency.

The students worked under my supervision and were permitted to handle all aspects of the cases through case disposition. Final authority to settle was retained
by a representative of the governmental client. Because of this affiliation, students were also given the opportunity to observe settlement negotiations being
conducted by attorneys in the agency in cases that were similar to their own.
46. In the questions included in this critique, the students must respond both to
strategy issues and to ethics issues. For example, they are asked whether there
was any statement made by either attorney that they thought was not completely
true, or that could have misled the other party. They are asked to respond to
their feelings about the use of this type of tactic.
47. As has been noted by Robert Condlin, one of the difficult issues in clinical teaching is the conflict between the desire to expose our practices to critique and the
nature of the teacher student relationship. If the student is asked to critique the
teacher, it may be risky to be honestly critical. If the student is asked to critique
her own performance, she may be legitimately concerned about the negative con.
sequences to her grade. See Robert J. Condlin, "Tastes Great-Less Filling:
" The
Law School Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45 (1986).
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Only after this fairly intensive exposure to the negotiation process
are students permitted to engage in negotiations in their own cases.
As a first step, they must plan their negotiation by completing a written analysis of their case and their proposal for settlement. This analysis is then discussed and, when appropriate, the opponent is
contacted in order to explore the possibility of settlement.
The need for, and the value of, this multi-faceted approach is clear
to me for a number of reasons. First, with respect to the process and
strategy of negotiation, students reveal their misgivings and confusion
in the discussions and in their role-playing. For example, students
often show reluctance to initiate settlement discussions for fear of appearing weak. They hesitate to name a figure because they are uncertain about the correct figure with which to begin; should they start
very high, very low, or with the figure that is close to their actual
desires. They also fear that they may have seriously over- or undervalued the case, or misread the opponent's real assessment of the case.
Once the negotiations have begun, it is common for students to
conduct the negotiation as if it were a debate, or an argument to the
court, attempting to refute rather than to hear the adversary's statements. Often their fear or confusion leads them to deny every "fact"
the adverse party mentions-even facts they may know to be correct.
Again, fear of appearing weak or of losing leverage prompts behavior
8
which is often not productive.4
It is not merely the negotiation tactics that are affected by the novice's fear and confusion; these same factors may cause some of the unethical conduct that emerges in negotiation. The ethical confusion
about the role is apparent in the discussion and in the role-playing.
Students often do not see the ethical dilemmas presented to the practitioner when they are merely discussing ethics, probably because
they fail to fully identify with the advocate's role. In the classroom,
they fairly easily espouse an ethical or even super-ethical approach to
problems. Students are not as concerned about how their ethics will
impact on the client's interests because they do not strongly identify
with the client at that point. When the students are acting in role,
and especially when they are discussing strategy in an actual case,
they seem to often be at the opposite extreme. They sometimes fail to
even consider the ethical constraints that might bind them, and are
much quicker to rationalize conduct which they would have criticized
in a class discussion.
In class discussion of a videotape that presents some dramatic
moral and ethical issues in the context of a personal injury negotia48. See discussion of the adversarial model of negotiation in Menkel-Meadow, Problem Solving, supra note 7, at 777-79.
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tion,4 9 students have often exhibited the tendencies discussed above,
as they analyze the conduct of a defense attorney representing an insurance company. The case that serves as the basis for the discussion
involves an ill-prepared plaintiffs lawyer representing the parents of
a child killed in a car crash. The victim was not wearing his seat belt
and the plaintiffs attorney mistakenly believes that this fact would
constitute a contributory negligence bar to recovery. Additionally,
plaintiffs attorney is unaware of a key witness's changed testimony.
The defense attorney is clearly aware of, and is deliberately using,
plaintiffs attorney's mistaken view of both the law and certain key
facts in order to reach a settlement that is dramatically lower than
what the defendant is willing to pay.50
In the discussions of the actual conduct of each attorney and of
alternatives, many students favor full disclosure by the defense attorney of facts and law harmful to the defense in order to prevent an
unjustly low settlement figure. Some would go even further and recommend that defense counsel offer a fair, i.e., high, figure even though
a lower settlement could be reached.51
Notably, the tendency toward impartiality that emerges in class
discussions of "ethics" does not always carry over into their role-playing and client representation. During strategy meetings in their real
cases, students have often raised the possibility of lying in order to
procure an advantage in a case. For example, in seeking to schedule a
witness for a deposition, students may suggest misrepresenting the
witness's availability in order to secure a tactical advantage such as
concluding settlement discussions before the witness's harmful testimony is revealed. On occasion, students have suggested withholding
harmful documents or information prior to settlement discussions.5 2
49. The videotape that I use was produced by the ABA, and is entitled Dilemmas in
Legal Ethics: Negotiation with Discussion, DIL 2-P3. The text of the tape is reproduced in Bellow & Moulton, supranote 12, at 586-91, followed by a discussion
of the ethical issues.
50. Scott Dahl used this case as the basis for one of the hypotheticals that he posed to
14 trial attorneys to examine their personal views on the ethics of negotiation
practice. Dahl, supra note 8. In his article, Dahl reports that "[nlearly all of the
attorneys had no problem with the settlement." Id. at 189. Further, none of the
attorneys interviewed would have corrected the plaintiffs' attorney's mistaken belief as to the applicable law. Id. at 190.
51. When I have asked students whether they would reveal to their client-the insurance company defendant-what they did in the negotiation, they generally
express some discomfort with the prospect of doing so.
52. Both of these tactics are comparable to the conduct raised by the scenario described in the text above. See supra note 49. The tactics can be discussed with
careful reference to the applicable rules of procedure and found to be legitimate,
at least with respect to those rules. See, e.g., FED. R. CIrv. P. 26, 30 & 34. However, even if it is legitimate to delay discovery during settlement discussions in
order to avoid unnecessary expense, it is not necessarily ethical to do so in order
to procure an advantage relative to the outcome of the settlement.
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It has been my experience that once they are fully immersed in the
adversary role in their case work, students often do not consider the
ethical constraints they have discussed in the classroom. Their focus
is on succeeding in their representation of the client. As students
enter a grey area without clearly delineated rules, they feel greater
pressure to improvise. Absent rules and prior experience, they may be
overwhelmed by the need to achieve their ends by whatever means
seem effective. Additionally, students frequently perceive that their
opponents have engaged in deceptions, misrepresentations, and other
"sharp" practices. They perceive their conduct as justifiable survival
behavior.53
Thus, in the sanctuary of the classroom, the students' performance
strongly suggests that they will be driven by fairness concerns-perhaps to the detriment of a client. However, the very same students,
when engaged in strategy meetings in their own cases, appear oblivious to the ethical implications of their proposed action. The tensions
between fairness (both in terms of process and outcome) and advocacy,
demonstrated by these examples, go beyond the common difficulty of
putting into practice what one has learned in the classroom. Instead,
I believe, the tension is inherent in the system of lawyering for which
we are training our students. Consequently, the effort to help students reconcile their classroom ethics (or perhaps personal morality)
with their lawyering roles is especially difficult and important.
The clinical program outlined above is designed to provide the students with two means of avoiding the dilemmas described. First, the
reading, observation, and discussion are intended to alert the student
to the danger areas. By recognizing the various circumstances in
which specific issues may arise, the students are prepared to anticipate problems and to identify them as such. Second, the students' active participation in the negotiation process, both through role playing
and through their case work, together with their observations of actual negotiations, provides them with experience (including vicarious
experience) in the resolution of these issues.
While this curriculum significantly improves a student's ability to
negotiate ethically and effectively, I am increasingly persuaded that
the most difficult issues that are raised in the negotiation context cannot be resolved until the student has reached a level of moral maturity
and judgment that enables her to find an appropriate answer to questions left unanswered by the rules of professional ethics. Merely integrating ethical constraints (as embodied in the Code and the Model
53. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. See also Hill, supra note 17, at 373;
Menkel-Meadow, Problem Solving, supranote 7, at 836-38; Simon, supranote 14,
at 1099. Each of these commentators discusses the necessity for the fair-minded
or cooperative attorney to modify her conduct when dealing with an aggressive
opponent.
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Rules) with lawyering practices is not enough because the rules do not
supply answers to the tough questions. For example, a student well
versed in the Code would be unprepared to decide, in the midst of a
bargaining session, how to respond to the judge who asks, in the presence of an adversary, how much money her client is prepared to spend
to settle the case. As noted by at least one commentator, hesitation at
that point could be disastrous; the truth could greatly prejudice the
client; a lie might be unethical.54
Issues concerning the disclosure of harmful evidence and/or legal
authority are equally difficult to resolve. If, for example, the student
learns of a witness whose testimony would undercut her case, the
question of whether she can delay revealing the witness, in response
to a legitimate discovery demand, in order to attempt to reach a settlement is not resolved merely by applying the "rule" to the facts. Certainly, it may be appropriate to stay discovery while settlement
discussions are proceeding. Suggesting a stay for the specific purpose
of concealing information, rather than for the purpose of curtailing unnecessary discovery, is not clearly improper according to any rule. In
some respects the propriety of the conduct may depend on the circumstance in which it arises: what representations are made by each side,
what each understands to be the basis of the settlement discussions,
how important or prejudicial the concealed information, and other
similar factors. Again, these are not judgments the novice attorney
will be prepared to make based solely on her knowledge of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules.
IV. THE TENSION BETWEEN REFORM AND THE ADVOCACY
MODEL
The ethos of the profession is embodied in the notion of the lawyer
as advocate in an adversary system. 55 This advocacy role is often
cited in objection to a rule of negotiation conduct that would require
honesty and candor.56 However, the role of the advocate, the formal
rules of dispute resolution (e.g., the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure),
and the Canons of Ethics are adapted and directed to a model of dispute resolution that is completely at odds with the typical negotiation
model. The litigation model contains formal rules of evidence and pro54. White, supra note 112, at 932-33 & n.20. Cf. Rubin, supra note 12, at 586.
55. MONROE H. F'REEDMtAN, LAwYERs' ETHICs IN AN ADvERSARY SYsTEm (1975); STEPHEN LANDSmAN, SECTION OF L-TIGATION Amx. BAR ASS'N, READINGS ON ADVER-

(1988). See Charles
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the Lawyer-ClientRelation, 85 YALE L. J. 1060 (1976). See also Condlin, supra note 18, at 87-93; Simon,
supra note 14, at 1133-35; American Lawyers Code of Conduct, Preface, supra
SARIAL JUSTICE: THE AmERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION

note 12.

56. See, e.g., White, supra note 12, at 928.
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cedure, a fact finder whose decision will be imposed on the litigants, a
referee to monitor compliance with the rules, and a complete record of
what factors influenced the decision resolving the dispute. The lawyer
as advocate is held in check by these structural features designed to
guarantee procedural and outcome fairness. As discussed in Part
III.A of this Article, these structural guarantees are totally absent in
the negotiation process.
The courtroom advocate is typically held to a higher standard of
honesty and fairness than the negotiator. Lying and misrepresentation by attorneys in either pre-trial or trial proceedings may occur, but
these practices are rather uniformly condemned. The advocacy role in
the courtroom has never been understood to permit (much less to require) the attorney to make false, misleading, or deceptive
statements. 57
A. Views of Negotiation Reform: Changing Rules, Changing
Ethos
One response to the problems described above might be a reform of
the rules, especially the rules pertaining to professional responsibility,
in order to provide the guidance of specific prohibitions and requirements that are missing in the process. Many commentators have proposed such reforms.58 Others have advocated models of negotiation
that eschew heavy-handed, misleading, or outright dishonest tactics,
in favor of the type of problem solving approach described by Fisher
and Ury in Getting To Yes.59
57. Model Rule 3.3 states that "A lawyer shall not knowingly: make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1)(1983).
The comment section provides that "when evidence that a lawyer knows to be
false is provided by a person who is not the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer
it regardless of the client's wishes." Id. Rule 3.3 cmt.
Similarly, the Model Code states that "In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not; knowingly make a false statement of law or fact." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmmrrY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1980).
58. See supra note 8. Professor Condlin describes the possible responses to the dilemma as including, interalia, adopting a more "ethical" zealous advocacy norm,
or a more "practical," meaning more cooperative, bargaining norm. Condlin,
supra note 18, at 87-93.
59. In the original edition of GnrrING To YES, Fisher and Ury proposed a model of
negotiating that was described as problem solving. See supra note 17. The problem solving approach to negotiating has been endorsed and supported by other
commentators, such as Professor Menkel-Meadow, see supra notes 7 and 20, and
Professor Hill, see supra note 17. One group of authors concluded that they could
not agree about the desirability of a code of negotiation ethics for a slightly different reason. They stated that "the strongest argument against a code of negotiation ethics is fear that cooperative negotiators would feel bound to comply with it
... and would let down their guard on the assumption that competitive negotiators were also complying with similar rigor." Lloyd Burton et al., Feminist The-
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There are thoughtful studies, such as Gerald R. Williams' Legal
Negotiationand Settlement60 and Paul M. Lisnek's A Lawyer's Guide
To Effective Negotiations and Mediation,61 that attempt to illustrate
that the most effective, or the most respected, negotiators are both
trustworthy and fair in their dealings with others. Williams, for example, bases his conclusions on a survey of lawyers' attitudes about
what makes an effective lawyer. Williams reports on the characteristics that are attributed to effective "cooperatives"62 and effective
"competitives,"63 and concludes that more of the effective negotiators
are in the cooperative mode. Lisnek does not specifically endorse the
style that he labels "cooperative" as being more "moral," but he does
reveal a preference for this style.64 It should be noted that both of
these authors equate cooperative style with reasonable and fair conduct. "Cooperatives feel a high commitment to reasonable and fair negotiation; they do not view the process as a game. Cooperative
negotiators assume negotiation presents an opportunity in which both
sides can win. They seek to negotiate in an objective, fair, and trustworthy manner."65

Others have similarly expressed a preference for the cooperative as
contrasted with the competitive style of negotiating. Both Carrie
Menkel-Meadow66 and Eve Hill67 have written about the advantages,

from the feminist perspective, of cooperative bargaining, noting that
the cooperative style gives effect to women's voices and concerns. Hill
states that the competitive style contributes to the silencing of women's voices. 68 Menkel-Meadow expresses a similar view in the folory, ProfessionalEthics, and Gender-RelatedDistinctionsin Attorney Negotiating
Styles, 1991 J. DIsp. RESOL. 199, 216 (1991).
60. WmLLAwS, supra note 19.
61. LiSNE , supra note 8.

62. W.IA s, supra note 19, at 50. Both authors use these terms; the descriptions
provided here are by Lisnek. The cooperative negotiator "feels a high commitment to a reasonable and fair negotiation; they do not view the process as a game.
Cooperative negotiators assume negotiation presents an opportunity in which
both sides can succeed or win. They seek to negotiate in an objective, fair, and
trustworthy manner." Id.
63. Id. at 47. The effective competitive negotiator "seeks victory, rather than a win
on the merits. The ethical component that ought to underlie the process is of
little concern to the competitive negotiator. Success of this style depends on the
ability to create sufficient pressure and tension to induce an emotional reaction in
the opponent to lead to a reduction in the opponenfs expectation of what can be
accomplished. If the pressure is inappropriate to the person or setting, the style
can lead to a termination of the proceedings." Id.
64. See LisNEn, supra note 8, at 47-50, (discussing the relative merits of the two
styles).
65. IsNmic, supra note 8, at 50. See WnmuAms, supra note 19, at 20-25.
66. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7.
67. Hill, supra note 17.
68. Id. at 370-73.
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lowing: "Whether a focus on the needs of both parties is a particularly
female mode of problem solving is still unknown. To the extent that it
focuses on a broader way to solve problems it obviously should be of
use to all legal negotiators-male or female."69
These various expressions of a need for, and an acceptance of, a
more fairness-oriented model of negotiation are encouraging, but are
far from conclusive. None of the writers is confident of the outcome of
the cooperative model in the face of an unabashed competitive negotiator. Lisnek follows his praise of the cooperative style with a section
that focuses on the need to control and conceal information. He acknowledges that the cooperative negotiator may have difficulty with
70
the need to limit disclosure, but stresses the importance of doing so.
While Menkel-Meadow does not directly address the issue of how
to impose cooperative conduct on the profession, she does offer some
thoughts about how to respond when the adversary is making a problem-solving approach difficult.71 Hill seems less optimistic: "When
faced with such competitive tactics, the cooperative negotiator must
either forsake the cooperative approach and battle the competitive negotiator on her own field, continue the cooperative approach and take
the very real risk of 'losing' to the competitor, or quit."72
Williams, on the other hand, acknowledges the lack of real law pertaining to the area of negotiation and calls for the adoption of specific
rules. 73 He looks to the area of contract law as a model for the kinds
of rules that might be imposed, including rules of good faith and fair
dealing and rules prohibiting the use of threats. While many would
agree with Williams's proposals for reform, it is important to consider
the reasons why no such reform has yet occurred.
69. Menkel-Meadow, Problem Solving, supra note 7, at 798. In an article reporting
on two studies, a group of researchers concluded that there were no statistically
significant differences in the numbers of male and female attorneys who display
strong "care" orientations (which is equated with cooperative bargaining style).
Burton, supra note 59, at 227-28. Further, they concluded that attorneys who
exhibit a high degree of sensitivity to either "Care" or to "Justice" concerns were
both the more cooperative and the more effective group of negotiators, id. at 23132, 249-50, and that neither of these "moral orientations" is more predominate in
male or female attorneys. Id. at 228-29. They also conclude, somewhat contrary
to prevailing notions, that "[clompetitive negotiating behaviors are rated not as
an implementation of the Ethic of Justice, but as a departure from Justice." Id.
at 240. See notes 117-21, infra, and accompanying text for an explanation of the
"Care" and "Justice" orientations.
70. LIsNEK, supra note 8, at 66. This reflects the dichotomous nature of this process
in which one is pulled in two competing directions-truth and fairness, on the
one hand, and winning the contest on the other. There is no doubt that most
negotiators have been torn by these competing forces-except perhaps the truly
competitive for whom there is no truth and justice pull. Id.
71. Menkel-Meadow, Problem Solving, supra note 7, at 834-38.
72. Hill, supra note 17, at 373.
73. WnLLAMs, supra note 19, at 90-104.
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B. Advocacy Ethic Inhibits The Meaningful Revision of
Negotiation Practice
There is substantial disagreement among commentators on what is
presently permitted, or proscribed; more to the point, commentators
do not agree on what the rules should provide. The need for reform of
the process of negotiation is not universally endorsed. The informality, flexibility, and freedom of the process are attributes that many
cite as essential to the continued success and viability of the process. 74
Without necessarily accepting or rejecting these arguments, I want to
turn to an analysis of some of the proposals for reform. I find the overall impact of the various proposals to be troubling because, in sum, I
believe that they are either unworkable or do not achieve any significant success in resolving the difficult issues.
The events surrounding the drafting of the Model Rules demonstrate the irreconcilable viewpoints on whether some common negotiating tactics should be allowed or proscribed. 7 5 In the early versions
of the Model Rules, there were specific rules that pertained to negotiation that required a high standard of conduct on the part of the attorney. There were provisions requiring fairness, truthfulness, and
disclosure when necessary to prevent even an implicit misrepresentation. These rules were either dropped from the Rules as adopted, or
substantially modified so as to lessen their impact on the conduct of
attorneys in negotiation. 7 6 While some commentators argued that
74. See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 8; Guernsey, supra note 8, at 125-26; Norton, supra
note 12, at 500-02 passim; White, supra note 12, at 927-28.
75. See Wetlaufer, supranote 38, at 1224-26 and accompanying text (describing some
of the most common types of misrepresentations and other tactics that occur in
negotiation).
76. In a draft version of the Model Rules, Rule 4.2 (a) required that "a lawyer... be
fair in dealing with other participants" in conducting negotiations. This was the
focus of Professor White's comments in his article, supra note 12. The fairness
requirement, along with another draft provision that would have proscribed
fraudulent or unconscionable agreements by lawyers, was dropped from the final
version of the Model Rules. In the Proposed Final Draft version of Rule 4.1, there
was a provision that would have required disclosure in circumstances where "failure to make the disclosure is equivalent to making a material misrepresentation." MODEL RuLEs OF POFEssIoNA CoNDuCT, Rule 4.1 (b)(1) (Proposed Final
Draft 1981). This mandatory disclosure provision was also dropped from the
adopted version of the Model Rules. The drafting history of Model Rule 4.1 indicated that the ABA House of delegates wanted to limit the scope of Model Rule
4.1 (b). According to Hazard and Hodes, the ABA House of Delegates substantially revised the proposed draft to significantly narrow the permissible range of
disclosures adverse to the client. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WnLIAm HODES,
THE LAw OF LAwYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDuCT, 711-12 (2nd ed. 1990). Combining Model Rules 4.1 (b) and 1.6, the
attorney's disclosure of client misrepresentation is not required unless it falls
into the exceptions stated under Rule 1.6, which are to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act likely to result in imminent death or bodily harm or to
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truly ethical conduct requires honesty, not just an absence of egregious lying, 7 7 others countered that the essence of skillful negotiating
rests on the ability to mislead the adversary.78 Absolute requirements of honesty, fairness, and disclosure of all material facts and
controlling law were not universally endorsed.79 Although the Model
Rules, as adopted, prohibit material misrepresentations of law and
fact, the Comments specifically except (and therefore accept) the kinds
of misrepresentations that appear to be most prevalent in the
process.SO
Among the criticisms of the proposals was the objection that these
requirements would be inconsistent with the lawyer's role as an advocate.8 1 Some commentators, who have subsequently considered the
desirability of a negotiation ethic that can be described as universalist,82 have similarly rejected it as inconsistent with the lawyer's role
as we understand it.83
My own analysis is that this objection is partly right and partly
wrong. It is true that there is an inconsistency between the lawyer's
role as presently perceived by lawyers, and the application of the universal ethical principles of fairness and honesty. To acknowledge this
is not necessarily to accept the conclusion that these principles are
inappropriate. It is equally plausible that the perception by lawyers of
their role in the negotiation process is seriously flawed. In the discussion that follows in Part V this idea will be explored more fully.
A second objection to an honesty requirement is, in some aspects,
even more alarming in the message that it sends. The objection is
that, given the secrecy in which negotiations typically take place, the
enforcement of rules requiring honesty and candor would be virtually

77.
78.
79.
80.

81.

82.
83.

establish a defense for the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client. Id.
See Rubin, supra note 12.
See White, supra note 12.
See Dahl, supra note 8, (discussing the range of viewpoints on these issues).
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESsIONAL CoNDucT, Rule 4.1 cmt. 2 (1983). The Rule prohibits only "material" misrepresentations. In the Comments, two types of misrepresentations that are common in negotiation are defined as "nonmaterial":
"estimates of price or value placed on the subject matter of a transaction" and "a
party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement." Id.
See AM. BAR ASS'N, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr: THam DEVELOPmENT IN THE ABA HousE OF DELEGATES, 145
(1987); Perschbacher, supra note 8, at 97 n.119; White supra note 12, at 937passim. See also Condlin, supra note 18, at 92-98, in which he discusses some additional objections to the elimination of the advocacy ethic, while suggesting some
modification, particularly in the area of civil dispute resolution.
See Walter H. Bennett, Jr., Making Moral Lawyers: A Modest Proposal,36 CATH.
U.L. RFv. 45 (1986). "Universalist" theory is understood as having one overall
morality for both personal and professional conduct. Id.
See Norton, supra note 14, at 512-16. See also Wetlaufer, supra note 8, at 125464.
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impossible. Further, one might reasonably expect widespread violations. Better to have no rule than a rule that will be widely ignored.8 4
What this indicates about us, as a profession, is deeply disturbing-in
large measure because it rings true. That is, given the way lawyers
generally perceive their roles, adherence to a rule of conduct can only
be expected if the conduct is visible and if transgressors know that
they will be punished.85
The notion of accepting, as a norm for the legal profession, behavior that is immoral by universal standards is, I feel, offensive. It is
more offensive to defend our decision to do so because we are too ineffective and uncreative to find a way to enforce a requirement of truthfulness. However, the profession is clearly not prepared at this time to
impose on itself the requirement of vigorous honesty in negotiation.
For the reasons just discussed, and perhaps others, lying in negotiations has been officially accepted by the profession. Some reform proposals are aimed at delineating, restricting, and codifying the kinds of
misrepresentations that are acceptable and the kinds that are to be
condemned. 8 6 Some would look to the prevailing norms and practices
in order to try to discern a "principled" basis (or ethic) to govern appropriate misrepresentations.8 7 I find these proposals unsatisfying and
unworkable for two reasons. First, accepting partial honesty as a
norm in the context of negotiation is unjustifiable on moral grounds.
To allow ourselves to engage in deceit, as long as we are clever and
precise enough to do so within the "safe" bounds, may be a workable
rule, but it can hardly be said to embody a moral principle.88 Second,
I have found efforts to delineate good lies from bad lies-as a rule
based judgment-a difficult and hazy operation. By this I mean that
it is nearly impossible to define precisely the line between puffing or
bluffing (good lies) and material misrepresentations of fact or law (bad
lies). If the ethics of the profession in the context of negotiation is to
permit, applaud, and encourage good lies as leading to success, and if
the profession is unable to articulate precisely where the line is to be
drawn, then one hardly need be surprised to find success oriented
negotiators lying whenever the circumstances so dictate. Thus, it
seems to me, the end result of the "solution" is no different from the
problem.
84. See Dahl,supra note 8,passim; Guernsey, supranote 8, at 125; White, supra note
12, at 927, 937.
85. See infra, Part IV.A, for a discussion of the work of moral psychologists and the
stages of moral development.
86. See, e.g., Guernsey, supra note 8; Perschbacher, supra note 8.
87. See, e.g., Norton, supranote 14; White, supra note 12. See also Wetlaufer, supra
note 8, at 1236-71.
88. Accord Wetlaufer, supra note 8.
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V. EDUCATING FOR MATURE MORAL JUDGMENT
In a provocative article entitled Ethical Discretion in Lawyering
William Simon proposed an approach to ethics rules that would require an individual attorney to make discretionary judgments in conducting negotiations as well as in other tasks.8 9 In sum, this
approach would permit or require the attorney as negotiator (and in
other contexts as well) to factor into her decisionmaking and conduct
her personal and professional ethics.90 He suggested, for example,
that a lawyer representing a poor and powerless client may need to be
unfettered by strict rules of conduct when dealing with a forceful adversary, because of the great imbalance of power and the risk of an
unfair outcome.9 1
My principal reaction to Professor Simon's proposal at the time I
first became acquainted with his work was shock. I could not imagine
entrusting the profession as a whole with the type of discretionary
judgment that Simon was proposing. It struck me that he was advocating a standard for a profession that was different from the profession which I knew, and that his standard was unrealistic. I have since
concluded that Professor Simon's vision is correct, that attorneys
should indeed be governed in their decisions and actions by their
moral beliefs. However, until we have begun to equip the profession,
as a whole, to listen to and exercise moral judgment, the abandonment
of a strict rules-based ethic could be disastrous. In order for discretion
to be exercised responsibly, moral judgment must be developed in individual professionals. More importantly, moral judgment must be accepted as a norm for the legal profession.
89. Simon, supra note 14. In his own words, "The lawyer should take those actions
that, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem most
likely to promote justice." Id. at 1090.
90. Id. at 1113-19. Simon actually criticizes the conventional discourse that tends to
characterize one possible set of concerns as "legal" and a competing set as
"moral," because, in his view this characterization sets up the legal concerns as
the professional, objective set, and the moral concerns as personal. Id. Nonetheless, his discussion of values, fairness, and justice seems to implicate the types of
concerns that others refer to as moral.
91. Actually, Simon uses this example in two ways. In his first example, he posits
that the attorney may take more aggressive action to achieve the client's purposes in the face of ambiguous legislative intent. Id. at 1105-06. In a variation on
this hypothetical, he acknowledges that, in some circumstances, the attorney
may act aggressively even when the legislative intent is clear, if the client's circumstances are sufficiently desperate. "[T]he lawyer might conclude that this
value [minimal material subsistence] is fundamental and hence that norms that
violate it are not entitled to respect." Id. at 1116. Finally, Simon states that the
lawyer representing the powerful client against the poor and poorly represented
adversary has the obligation to act so as to produce a just and fair result, even if
that requires that he assist the adversary. Id. at 1098-99.
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The moral and ethical issues raised by the process of legal negotiation are not isolated; throughout the legal profession one finds similar
themes concerning the role of morality in the study and practice of
law. Numerous forceful and moving articles have documented the
need of students, clients, and the profession for more moral and
human content in the education of lawyers and the practice of law.92
Moral judgment may be called for in a variety of contexts-the decision to take or reject a case, whether to raise a particular defense, how
to examine or cross-examine a witness, and many other similar matters.9 3 In negotiation, the role of moral judgment may be more
predominate because the question of misrepresentation is so central to
the process.
In this section I want to explore some of the themes of both the
moral psychologists, who have advocated education for the growth of
moral judgment, 94 and the feminist writers, who have advocated the
recognition of a moral voice that is different from the one that predominates in our legal teaching and writing.95 I will then consider how
some of these themes might be developed in legal education generally,
and in clinical teaching specifically. Finally, I would like to revisit the
92.

Critics within the legal profession tend to accept the social utility of the
adversary system ofjustice and the legalism now so pervasive in Western societies, particularly in our own country. These internal critics
often recognize various failings of the adversary system but believe that
they can be corrected, that more competent and ethical lawyers can be
produced. These critics frequently look to legal education as the appropriate means of inculcating a concern for ethical lawyering.
James R. Elkins, Moral Discourseand Legalism in Legal Education, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 11 (1982). For examples of commentators who advocate the need for general reform in legal education-in specific to include a more effective emphasis on
ethics, see e.g., RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFEsSIoNAL DEcISIONs: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS (1989);
THoMAs L. SHAFFER & ROBERT S. REDMOND, LAWYERS, LAW SuNzlrrs AND PEo.
PLE (1977); Simon Yeznig Balian, Personal Responsibility for Professional Actions, 32 CATH. LAW. 337 (1989); Bennett, supra note 2; Richard 0. Brooks,
EthicalLegal Identity and ProfessionalResponsibility, 4 GEo. J. LEG. ETmcs 317
(1990); Calm, supra note 6; Gary S. Goodpaster, The Human Arts of Lawyering:
Interviewing and Counseling,27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1975); Menkel-Meadow, Problem Solving, supra note 7; Thomas L. Shaffer, Moral Implications and Effects of
Legal Educationor: BrotherJustinianGoes to Law School, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 190
(1984); Simon, supra note 14.
93. Simon, for example, addresses the issues of accepting representation for unpopular or undeserving clients. Simon, supra note 14.
94. Lawrence Kohlberg's teachings provide the foundation for several of the writings
that advocate paying greater attention to the development of moral judgment in
our law school teaching. See Bennett, supra note 2; Hartwell, ClinicalEducation,
supranote 2; Hartwell, ExperientialTeaching,supra note 2; Richards, supra note
2. Also see the works of Lawrence Kohlberg, some of which are cited in note 2.
95. See GmIGAN, supra note 1; NEL NODDINGS, CARING, A FEmNE APPROACH TO
ETmos AND MORAL EDUCATION (1984); JACK & JACK, supra note 92; Calm, supra
note 6; Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra note 6; Burton, supra note 59.
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issues that pertain to the practice of negotiation raised at the outset;
to consider how the picture might change if the focus of our teaching
were to change. It is my belief that merely writing better rules will
not suffice unless we change the understanding among practitioners of
the role of moral judgment in their professional lives.
A. The Work of Moral Psychologists
Numerous psychology writings, and an increasing number of legal
articles, have discussed the stages of development of moral judgment
and the implications for formal education.96 These writings make a
persuasive case for including moral judgment as a specific and legitimate topic when teaching students to analyze issues and to resolve
problems requiring lawyer intervention.
The studies and writings of Lawrence Kohlberg are central to the
current theories of the development of moral judgment. Kohlberg has
identified what he refers to as stages of development in which different means of analyzing moral questions are demonstrated.97 In the
earliest stages (One and Two) the infant/child responds to rules primarily because of the power of the rule maker.98 Individual interests
and needs are the motivation, but the child has a developing sense of
the need to respond to the dictates (i.e., rules) of an authority/power
figure.
An individual reasoning at Stage Three considers the expectations
and feelings of others with whom he has a relationship. He will try to
adapt his behavior to garner approval from people who are important
to him.9 9

The Stage Four individual is essentially a rules-oriented moral
reasoner. Rules, and adherence to rules, are central to this individual's conception of moral conduct and reasoning.oo This is, essen96. See supra note 94; Leming, supra note 2.

97. My purpose here is neither to defend nor to criticize Kohlberg's theories and
methodologies. I merely make reference to his theories and their relationship to
other views on the need for reform of legal education. For a very helpful summary of the teachings and theory of Lawrence Kohlberg, especially as related to
legal education, see Willging & Dunn, The Moral Development of the Law Stu-

dent: Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306 (1981). See
also Hartwell, Clinical Education,supra note 2, at 133-41; Richards, supra note
2, at 364-73.
98. See Hartwell, ClinicalEducation,supranote 2, at 135-36; Richards, supra note 2,
at 367.
99. Hartwell, Clinical Education, supra note 2, at 136; Richards, supra note 2, at
367. I am quite consciously using the male pronoun in reference to Kohlberg. As
discussed infra, his studies did not include female subjects. See infra note 112
and accompanying text.
100. Hartwell, Clinical Education, supra note 2, at 137; Richards, supra note 2, at
367.
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tially, the law student that we create if we are successful in our efforts
to teach him to think like a lawyer.
A Stage Five individual is still rule-oriented, but with a more critical perspective. Rules might be disregarded, for example, where a
greater social good would thereby be achieved. 1 0 '
Stage Six represents a level of mature moral judgment that may
only be an ideal. The individual at this stage is governed largely by
his individually held moral principles which, in case of conflict, will
overcome societal rules and norms.10 2
My purpose here is decidedly not to attempt to explain or to defend
Kohlberg's theories, or other models of moral development. There are
many very useful and informative articles available in the fields of
both psychology and law that have done this.103 From a variety of

these readings, I have derived several themes which I feel justify, and
indeed mandate, that the development of mature moral judgment be
specifically included in the law school agenda:
1. Our typical law students are at 10
an4age where development beyond Stages
3 or 4 to 5 (or 6) is most likely.
2. Some studies indicate that significant further moral growth ends with the
end of formal education. 1 05
3. Teaching legal analysis while ignoring
or debasing moral issues thwarts
6
the growth of moral judgment.10
4. Many complexities of the lawyering
profession are neglected by the domi10 7
nant focus in the curriculum.

Although there appears to be some lingering debate on some of the
features of Kohlberg's teachings, there is apparent acceptance of his
view that the most mature levels of reasoning are attained when an
individual is in his 20's and 30's (or later).0s Thus, it is unlikely that
a significant number of our students will have achieved this prior to
entering law school.
The fact that moral growth may be coextensive with formal education is explained by examining the manner in which moral develop101. Hartwell, Clinical Education, supra note 2, at 138.
102. LAWRENCE KoHBBER, The Meaning and Measurement of Moral Development, in
ESSAYS ON MoRAL DEVELOPMENT: TiH PHILOSOPHY OF MoRAL DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 2, at 425. But see Richards, supra note 2, at 368-69.
103. In his 1990 article Professor Hartwell states that "[a]s of 1983, there were ap-

proximately 5000 published articles dealing with moral development." Hartwell,
ClinicalEducation, supra note 2, at 135 n.15.
104. Richards, supra note 2, at 369; Willging & Dunn, supra note 97, at 317-18.
105. Hartwell, ClinicalEducation,supranote 2, at 140; Willging & Dunn, supra note
97, at 323.

106. Richards, supra note 2, at 370.
107. See infra Part V.C.
108. See Leming, supra note 2, for a discussion of some of the revisions in Kohlberg's
teachings in response to criticisms, and a discussion of the relative levels ofmoral
maturity for college graduates and teachers. See also Bennett, supra note 2, at

47.
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ment at the higher levels is believed to occur.10 9 Several writers have
suggested that in order to develop beyond the stage 4 rules-orientation, a somewhat formal discussion process that has been called
"moral discourse" must occur. The individual must learn to analyze
critically the rule, its basis, its impact on society, and its impact on
individuals. The dialog that produces this analysis can occur within
an individual, but may be more likely if encouraged by, for example, a
teacher or a mentor.1 ' 0
The first two reasons for attending to the issue of moral growth in
our law school curricula are, in themselves, fairly persuasive. The
third and fourth are, I believe, compelling. When we teach our students not to consider the moral content of a "legal" problem, not to be
derailed by personal morality in their quest to "think like lawyers," we
are affirmatively thwarting further development of their moral judgment. I believe there is ample evidence that, indeed, this is what has
gone on in the typical law school curriculum for a very long time.1
Consequently, we cannot excuse ourselves from the business of moral
education by claiming that it is not our job; we are teaching by omission and by the specific direction to disregard certain "irrelevant"
impulses.
B. Feminist Perspective on Moral Development and the
Role of the Lawyer
Carol Gilligan has questioned and criticized the methodologies of
Kohlberg and other psychologists for omitting women's experiences
and voices from their studies.112 Despite the differences in some of
their conclusions, however, the emerging voices of feminist writers
concerned with women's moral development are in harmony with the
109. Leming, supra note 2, at 247; Bennett supra note 2, at 56-60; Hartwell, Experiential Teaching, supra note 2; Richards, supra note 2, at 370.
110. In his overview of the revisions in Kohlberg's work, James Leming summarizes
the moral discussion approach. "The important conditions necessary to stimulate

stage advance with the moral discussion approach are : (1) Exposure to situations
posing problems and contributions for child's current moral structure; (2) exposure to next highest stage; and (3) an atmosphere of openness and exchange." He

goes on to say that "[s]tudent stage change will be most pronounced in those
groups in which the teacher uses skilled Socratic probing. Also, while no change
will occur without any one of these elements, it is not essential that the teacher
supply them if the students supply them themselves." Leming, supra note 2, at
247.
111. Bennett, supra note 2, at 48-54. Himmelstein, supra note 7, at 516 states: "Another premise is that much in legal education fails to foster, and may even demean, a professional vision sensitive and responsive to the human dimensions of
'legal' reality." See also Menkel-Meadow, Portia,supra note 6; Richards, supra

note 2, at 361. These are by no means the only sources of criticism of the inadequacy of our current system of law training.
112. GmLiAN,supra note 1, at 5-23.
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themes of the moral psychologists and law teachers who espouse their
teachings. Both recognize the need to attend to the teaching of moral
judgment and conduct in legal education.113
There are some strikingly similar themes that emerge from many
of the critics who actually support the call for greater moral content in
our teaching. Many women feel dissonance in their role as a lawyer
because of a perception that it requires abandonment of their own
ethic of care;1 14 the elevation of a standard of 'justice" over the standard of "care" has disserved a vast segment of the population of both
lawyers and cients;115 and strict application of rules without ade-

quate regard for context is misguided and inadequate for achieving
fair and sound solutions to complex problems.116 I feel that it is possible to acknowledge both the legitimate criticisms and, at the same
time, the valuable contributions of both of these perspectives on moral
development.
The studies and writing of Carol Gilligan led to the development of
the notion of a different moral perspective called a "voice".117 In her

writings, Gilligan identifies two separate clusters of norms and interests that tend to be articulated in response to questions involving ethical and moral dilemmas. The one she identifies with the "male" voice
is called "Justice," which includes a concern about objective rules and
application of the rules to situations without consideration of relationship factors.118 She criticizes many of the psychological studies of

moral development because they used only male subjects in their
studies and consequently derived a development scale that is skewed;
one in which the stages of development in moral reasoning by boys
and men is presented as the prototype of moral development.119 Gilligan identifies the ways in which some girls and women analyze moral
113. Compare NODDINGS, supranote 95; Goldfarb, supra note 3; Menkel-Meadow, Por-

114.
115.
116.
117.

118.
119.

tia, supra note 6 (feminist writers advocating changes in legal education to include moral judgment); with Bennett, supra note 2; and Hartwell, Experiential
Learning, supra note 2, at 522 (describing his methodology, Hartwell states: "I
would hope that my teaching-in which I do not consciously advocate either
Kohlberg or Gilligan, but instead, to the limits of my own moral consciousness,
support all student responses-would encourage growth on either or both of these
dimensions.")
JACK & JACK, supra note 92, at 95-123; Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra note 6.
Compare to Hartwell, ClinicalEducation, supra note 2, at 133-41.
See, e.g., Feminist Discourse, supra note 6 (discussion between Gilligan and
Menkel-Meadow); Cahn, supra note 6; Hartwell, ClinicalEducation, supra note
2, at 139; JACK & JACK, supra note 92, at 95-99 passim.
See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 3; Cahn, supra note 6, at 27-29 passim; Hartwell,
ClinicalEducation, supra note 2; Richards, supra note 2, at 371.
GIImA, supra note 1. In one of her articles, Professor Menkel-Meadow traces
briefly the history of this aspect of feminist scholarship. Menkel-Meadow, Portia,
supra note 6, at 39-45 & n.8.
Feminist Discourse, supra note 6, at 44, 47-48 (remarks of Carol Gilligan).
Id. at 45-49; GrIUGAN, supra note 1, at 5-23 passim.
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issues that would gain them a lower rank on a moral development
scale such as Kohlberg's.120 She describes the ways in which women
and girls in her studies express concerns about relationships, contexts, and fairness to others, and tend to have difficulty applying strict
rules to dictate outcomes. She labels these interests "Care" interests,
and I am using the term to encompass these same concerns. 12 1 In
describing women's responses to the question of abortion, for example,
Gilligan describes the different moral voice she hears in their words:
...I was comparing women with theory. I said this voice is different from the
voice that has been ascribed in the psychology of moral development, in moral
philosophy, and in the legal and political system which was sitting all round
my work. The way in which women were talking about the moral problem in
abortion did not fit the public discussion of abortion in this county.... They
asked, in effect whether it is responsible or irresponsible, moral or immoral, to
sustain and deepen an attachment under circumstances in which you cannot
be, for whatever reason, responsible, and in which you cannot care?...

To enter the legal system, therefore, women had to act as though they did not
know things that they felt they knew and that they did not in a sense understand issues of connection which could not be represented within the adversarial-rights model which pitted one life against the other.
The inclusion of two voices in moral discourse, in thinking about conflicts, and
in making choices, transforms the discourse. It is no longer either simply
about justice or simply about caring; rather, it is about bringing them together
12 2
to transform the domain.

Although some have criticized her approach for essentially accepting the imposition on women of a male-imposed standard of
"Care," other feminist writers have applauded her identification of a
different "female" perspective. 12 3 Critics have argued, and Gilligan
herself acknowledges, that it is overly-simplistic to assume that the
ethic of Care predominates in all women, any more than the ethic of
120. Gu.LIGAN, supra note 1, at 18; Marcus et al., supra note 6, at 48.
121. See, e.g., GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at 28-32.
122. Marcus et al., supra note 6, at 38-39, 45. These observations are in accord with
the conclusions of another group of authors who note that the actual negotiating
behaviors of male and female attorneys are not significantly different when
viewed as representations of either the Care or Justice orientations. Burton et
al., supra note 59, at 228, 229. In part, they attribute this to the perceived need
for female attorneys to conform to the norm in order to be effective: "Female interviewees believe that they are most effective when they are Competitive, and
that they need to behave in a Competitive manner in order to be Effective negotiators." Id. at 247 (capitalization in original). This possibility seems to be supported by an observation from Gilligan and Attanucci's work that asks whether
"it [is] possible that the focus on justice represents efforts by the students to align
themselves with the perceived values of the institution they are entering." Carol
Gilligan & Jane S. Attanucci, Two Moral Orientations, in MAPPING THE MoRAL
DomAIN 73, 83 (Carol Gilligan ed., 1988).
123. For summaries of some of the reactions to Gilligan's work, both critical and supportive, see Burton et al., supra note 59, at 206-10; Menkel-Meadow, Portia,
supra note 6, at 40-42 and notes 8, 9 & 10.
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Justice predominates in all men. 12 4 More women express care-related

concerns than do men, and more women express care-related, rather
than justice-related, moral reasoning.12 5 I think that a particularly
important point is how some of the women represented in these studies express their Care related perspectives. Many of them articulate
concerns about relationships, feelings of others, and context, only then
to dismiss these responses as being wrong.' 2 6 These women and girls
have apparently "learned" that their instinctive ethic is not the right
or mature one.
In the legal profession, there is a clash awaiting any would-be-professional whose personal moral perspective is more Care than Justice
dominated. She will need to learn to sublimate her concerns about
others with whom she comes in contact and stick to a rules based advocacy.12 7 The discomfort that this conflict produces has been documented, studied, and written about.128 Many women (and men with
similar moral perspectives) express their dissatisfaction with the professional norms that seem to require that parts of their self be buried,
hidden, and silenced. Jack and Jack describe ways in which lawyers
may cope with this dissonance: develop a professional and a personal
self, totally subdue the natural care orientation, or, perhaps for some,
to the care concerns
design a practice which allows them to give voice
while maintaining a professional demeanor.12 9
Other writers, such as Phyllis Goldfarb in a work entitled Theory
Practice Spiral, underscore the deficiency of teaching students rules
without context.' 30 She relates the theories of feminism to the practices of clinical education in order to demonstrate that both are firmly
grounded in the concept of contextual ethics and morality. Context,
she maintains, is necessary to give students the opportunity to develop insights about the deficiencies in the legal rules that are supposed to be neutral.'31
124. See, e.g., Gilligan & Attanucci, supra note 122; Burton et al., supra note 59, at
200-01 & n.8.
125. Id.
126. Gilligan says "I had noticed that while girls at about ten or eleven years of age
seemed to be quite outspoken and fairly sure of themselves, by nineteen they had
developed an acute tendency toward self-doubt and self-questioning. There was a
kind of... disbelief in their own ability to talk about reality." She also discusses
the discrepancy between what a girl has learned others mean by "fair" and her
own way of reasoning, which by others' definition is not fair. Marcus et al., supra
note 6, at 40, 43.
127. Id. at 55; JACK & JACK, supra note 92, at 99-105.
128. JACK & JACK, supra note 92; GnLiAN, supra note 1, at 135.
129. JACK & JACK, supra note 92, at 98-120, 281-86. See also Willging & Dunn, supra
note 97, at 315.
130. Goldfarb, supra note 3.
131. Id. at 1657-67.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:752

In her discussion of contextual learning and teaching, Goldfarb describes a process that looks very much like the moral discourse discussed above, except that she adds the dimension of acting rather
than merely discussing. Her theses seems to be somewhat consistent
with the Kolbergian view of the importance of role in resolving moral
dilemmas and in achieving moral growth, but she seems to take this
theory a step further and require role assumption (clinical practice)
32
rather than mere role playing.1
Like Goldfarb, Nel Noddings in Caring,A Feminine Approach to
Ethics and Morality,133 stresses the danger in an approach to education that emphasizes only rules without other (moral) content. Like
Goldfarb, she seems to espouse a view of moral growth that is, in part,
consistent with Kohlberg. Also like Goldfarb, she is not content to end
the responsibility of the educator with mere discussion: "Everything
we do then, as teachers, has moral overtones. Through dialogue, modeling, the provision of practice, and the attribution of best motive," we
nurture the ethical ideal.134
It is striking to me that the current state of legal education and the
profession's conception of ethics are inconsistent with both the feminist and the moral psychologist perception of mature moral judgment.
A strict adherence to rules is a stage that Kolhberg would describe, I
believe, as Stage Four reasoning. More mature judgment would be
represented by Stages Five and Six, where rules are considered, but
are not always strictly applied.135 When a greater societal or other
good will be achieved by abandoning the rules, and little corresponding harm would result, a more mature practitioner might forgo a rulebased response.136
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1662-67.
NODDINGS, supra note 95.
Id. at 179.
See Willging & Dunn, supra note 97, at 314-15.
In a memorable example from literature, two representatives of the criminal justice system are engaged in a battle of determination that seems to demonstrate
the clash between stage 4 and stage 5 reasoning. Bob Ewell, a character who was
responsible for beating his own daughter and the wrongful conviction, and subsequent death, of Tom Robinson, a man who had befriended her, had been found
dead with a knife in his ribs. Bob Ewell was killed while he was attacking the
two children of the lawyer who had represented the defendant, Tom Robinson.
Sheriff Tate is unwilling to let the death of Bob Ewell be classified as a homicide
because he knows that the responsible party, Arthur Radley, is a painfully reclusive individual who would suffer unbearably through the spectacle of a trial. In
confronting Atticus Finch, the prototype of the good and moral lawyer, he declares his determination to prevent the matter from going to trial.
"I never heard tell that it's against the law for a citizen to do his utmost
to prevent a crime from being committed, which is exactly what he did,
but maybe you'll say it's my duty to tell the town all about it and not
hush it up. Know what'd happen then? All the ladies in Maycomb includin' my wife'd be knocking on his door bringing angel food cakes. To
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A critic of the dogmatic nature of legal education has stated that
"[an ethics of rules is a minimalist ethics which undermines moral
discourse."13 7 The focus on rules and substantive content was the legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Christopher Columbus Langdell,
according to Professor Elkins.138 This fundamental distrust and de-

valuation of "morals," and the emphasis on the scientific and analytic
teaches students a way of reasoning that leaves the moral component
deliberately unheeded.' 3 9 Again, it seems significant to me that, like
the feminist writers discussed above, Professor Elkins advocates the
inclusion of another component-moral discourse-in legal education.
I feel that it is not essential to resolve the issues raised in the conflict between the Kohlberg view of development and the Gilligan view.
The similarities in their views, especially with respect to the need for
moral discourse, are more important than the differences. Both stress
the need for recognition of competing values and interests and the
need to provide students with a mechanism for resolving the dissonance that these competing interests create. Both see the achievement of mature moral judgment and conduct not in the blind
application of rules, but in the ability to utilize rules and other means
of resolving moral issues. Both see these issues as complex and textured, arising from context rather than from sterile facts.
The serious harm that has been done to the legal profession-to
clients, lawyers, and to societal interests-which has resulted from an
apparent disregard of care-based interests, cannot fully be gauged. It
can be understood, in part, from various anecdotal accounts. There
are accounts of the lawyers who left the profession because of the tension between personal morality and professional norms; there are accounts of lawyers who continue to practice, albeit somewhat
disaffectedly, for the same reasons.14 0 There are, of course, numerous
accounts of lawyers who can, and routinely do, justify contributing to
results which are unfair, unjust, and undesirable because they believe
that their duty requires that they disregard care-based concerns.' 4 '
my way of thinkin', Mr. Finch, taking the one man who's done you and
this town a great service an' draggin' him with his shy ways into the

limelight-to me, that's a sin. It's a sin and rm not about to have it on my
head. If it was any other man it'd be different. But not this man, Mr.
Finch.... I may not be much, Mr. Finch, but I'm still sheriff of Maycomb
County and Bob Ewell fell on his knife. Good night, sir!
Ku A MOCKINGBmD 273-76 (Warner Books 1960).
Elkins, supra note 10, at 20.
Id. at 32-34.
Id. at 28-31.
See JACK & JACK, supra note 92, at 110-20. The authors describe a range of responses for lawyers who feel the tension between role identification, which is associated with a rights perspective, and care concerns.
Id. at 99-110.
HARPER LEE, To

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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Ironically, neither Care nor Justice has been well served by our education practices.

C. Legal Education and Moral Growth
At this point I want to look more closely at what we are teaching
our students about moral judgment and how that varies from the models suggested in the literature on moral development. In our efforts to
train our students to think like lawyers, we tend to emphasize legal
principles and rules and quantitative facts.142 Feelings, emotions,
and care-based responses are usually seen as clouding our ability to
reason analytically. Both with respect to specific issues (impeaching

the truthful witness) and with respect to ultimate outcomes (e.g., the
tortfeasor is resolved of liability and the victim is uncompensated for
her loss), we are trained to consider neither our own moral responses

nor the feelings of the witness or the victim. This process of isolation
from feeling and emotion is to occur regardless of whether the feelings
are "negative" (e.g., uneasiness about cross-examining a truthful witness), or "positive" (e.g., empathy and concern for the victim).143
The basis and justification for our training is embodied in the Ca-

nons of Ethics which is fundamental to our understanding of our role
as lawyers.144 Our function, we are told, is that of an advocate; we are
not responsible, nor are we to be blamed, when the system fails to
produce a fair result. It is the system that we are consistently taught
to blame, rather than ourselves, when justice is not done, when fairness does not result, or when someone is hurt. 145 Consider, for exam142. See, e.g., Elkins, supranote 10, at 14-19; Willging & Dunn, supra note 97, at 33540.
143. In a critique of some of Kohlberg's views, particularly his lack of emphasis on the
emotions, John Martin Rich states that "[a)... way to determine whether a person has developed a moral concept is by observing if inappropriate emotions are
expressed in certain moral situations. Inappropriate overt emotions can be considered morally callous or a case of moral deficiency." John Martin Rich, Morality, Reason and Emotions, in Modgil & Modgil, supra note 2, at 212.
144. In an ABA publication on the adversary system, the following is part of what is
labelled "A Classic Description and Defense of the Adversary System": "It is a
fundamental principle of the lawyer's canons of ethics that he may not state to
the judge or jury that he personally believes in the innocence of his client ...
These rules concerning the lawyer's conduct in court are not only important in
themselves, but also for the spirit that lies back of them. They make it clear that
the lawyer is present, not as an individual with all of his likes and dislikes, beliefs and disbeliefs, but as one who plays an important role in the process of social
decision." Lon Fuller, The Adversary System, in READINGS ON ADvEasARiAL JusTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION,

47, 49 (Stephen Landsman, ed.

1988).
145. See JACK & JACK, supra note 92, at 100-02; Professor Elkins states: "One who
believes that professional morality is a matter of compliance with a disciplinary
code fails to ask what it means to be a good lawyer. To ask this question requires
that one look more closely at whether a good person can do what lawyers do in
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ple, the attorney representing a child in a foster care placement case.
The attorney's role is understood to be an advocate for the child's
wishes (the child is over 7 and presumed capable of expressing her
wishes). The child wants to remain in foster care with her aunt. The
attorney knows that part of the reason for this desire is that the aunt
has not been sending the child to school. This fact has not been discovered by the judge or the child welfare agency caseworker making
the recommendation. The attorney has been clearly told what the system expects of her: she is not to volunteer this information and is to
advocate what the child wants.146 Attorneys, who are stage 4 reasoners according to the Kohlberg scale, and who typify what Jack & Jack
refer to as maximum role identification, would have no difficulty accepting the limitations and requirements of this role, and in screening
out their own personal concerns and assumptions about whether they
were helping or hurting their young client by advocating her wishes.
It is important to emphasize that the attorney's ultimate decision-here, to advocate exactly what her young client wants-may be
precisely the same whether she reasons at stage 3,4,5 or 6. It is the
reasoning process, but not necessarily the outcome, that progresses in
these stages. 14 7 Further, it may be that the "rule" that dictates this
particular outcome was, at some point, the product of someone's stage
5 or 6 reasoning.148 The point here is not that the right or wrong retheir practice-defend guilty clients, take advantage of those whose attorneys inadequately represent them, help clients pursue aims which are detrimental to
the social order." Elkins, supra note 10, at 24.
146. The role of the attorney in representing the child in New York State in a variety

of proceedings is to advocate the child's expressed wishes, although that role is at
times ambiguous. In a case involving an "older" child the attorney would be
bound by the attorney-client privilege. By substituting a more legalistic role for

the older paternalism (or maternalism) that had previously informed the role of
child advocate, Children's Rights Advocates have sought to provide the kinds of

substantive and procedural protections to children that were constitutionally
mandated for adults. See N.Y. FAm. CouRT ACT § 241 and PracticeCommentary
by Douglas J. Besharov (McKinney 1983).
147. See Hartwell, Clinical Education,supra note 2, at 138-39.

148. According to Willging and Dunn, the Stage 5 reasoner will critically examine the
social utility of laws and rules out of a sense of obligation to protect the rights and
welfare of all. Willging & Dunn, supra note 97, at 315. The Stage 6 reasoner

makes decisions "on the basis of individually-derived principles of moral behavior and social justice," based on values such as justice and fairness. Id. at 315. It

is quite possible that an individual in either of these groups might reason that a
lawyer, as advocate for a minor who has reached the age of reason, should abide
by the client's desires, rather than substitute her own values and judgments for
those of the client. This reasoning might be especially powerful if the client is
likely to face very severe consequences, such as loss of freedom, incarceration in a
prison or prison-like environment, or separation from home and family. Thus,
the more advanced moral reasoner might have rejected a "best interest of the
child" standard for defining the role of the attorney, in favor of an advocacy-based

standard.
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suit is being achieved, but that we are depriving our professionals of
the capability of reaching a level of maturity at which they can reason
for themselves to the "right" result.149 If their reasoning and judg-

ment stop at the point of determining what the rules require, we are
training them to follow bad rules as well as good ones (or rules that, in
particular cases, produce bad results).150
I would like to return to the question of negotiation ethics and to
examine how a more mature moral reasoner might analyze these issues. In the negotiation example discussed earlier 5 31involving the
death of the child, the defense lawyer who has used his opponent's
ignorance of the law and the facts is essentially "blameless" under the2
Code because he did not affirmatively create the mistaken beliefs.15
The Code does not require that he correct the mistakes. For our students, unfortunately, knowledge of the rule may prevent their further
inquiry: should such conduct be tolerated; should there be a written
statement of understanding that would bind the parties; or should deception, in whatever guise, be forbidden in negotiation? The student
149. In the above example, that was derived from the experience of one of my students
who was involved in the representation of a child in a foster-care review proceeding, she expressed her discomfort with the requirement that she abide by the
client's wishes in this case. Nonetheless, out of a sense of duty to "follow the
rules," she did so without raising any question with her supervisor. I urged her
to raise her questions, not because I was in disagreement with the rule, but because she was. She would have benefitted from considering what reasoning had
led to the articulation of a seemingly inappropriate result. Also, by considering
carefully the responses to her queries, she might have either accepted the rule as
yielding the "right" result, or she might have discovered a means to a better
outcome.
150. An example of a situation where the result may well differ, depending on the
stage of moral development one has reached, was revealed in the reasoning of a
New York judge in a criminal case. Eight people were tried for needle possession,
a drug offense, arising from their efforts to distribute clean needles to addicts.
The Manhattan judge who acquitted them reasoned, in part, as follows:
This court is satisfied that the nature of the crisis facing the city,
coupled with the medical evidence offered, warranted the defendants'
actions.
This court is also satisfied that the harm the defendants sought to
avoid was greater than the harm in violating the statute. Hundreds of
thousands of lives are at stake in the AIDS epidemic....
The distinction, in broadest terms, during this age of the AIDS crises,
is death by using dirty needles versus drug addiction by using clean
needles. The defendants' actions sought to avoid the greater harm.
On the basis of her reasoning, the judge found that the necessity justification
in the state penal law absolved the defendants of criminal liability. Ronald Sullivan, Needle-Exchangers had Right to Break Law, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIaEs, June
26, 1991, at B1, B3.
151. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
152. In the strict Code analysis of the defense attorney's conduct, most of his conduct
is not a violation of the Rules. See Bellow & Moulton, supra note 12, at 595-97.
The attorney for the plaintiffs has probably violated several provisions, to the
detriment of his own clients. Id. at 591-95.
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may never reach these questions when she is taught that the rule permits the attorney, with knowledge of the mistakes, to remain silent:
this is not considered to be a "misrepresentation."
In class discussions of this hypothetical, this is precisely the place
where the majority of my students both begin and end the analysis.
They often become confused, and even somewhat irritated, when I try
to push them to respond to questions about whether the rule is good,
makes sense, or should be changed. They are, at least at the outset,
comfortable with responses such as "that's the fault of the other attorney and the clients should sue him for malpractice." On the other
hand, those students who feel great discomfort with the result of the
plaintiffs getting an unreasonable award cannot articulate a rationale
for their assertions that the defendant's attorney should simply offer
more money. They are not entirely comfortable with the fact that they
might need to inform the client that they could have secured a lower
settlement, but chose to offer more money. Both groups of students
have been short-changed by our failure to provide them with the opportunity to develop a satisfactory way to analyze this very difficult
problem.153

There are some examples to be found where the student is asked or
required to go beyond the rule and to explore the competing tensions,
including emotional tensions, that may make the application of the
rule seem unjust, immoral, or personally unacceptable. Two educators who have drawn on Kohberg's work to develop curricula that
utilize the discourse model to promote the development of more mature moral judgment are Steven Hartwell and David Richards.
Professor Hartwell has written about his use of the DIT in the curriculum that he developed, which is specifically designed to teach
moral judgment.154 In his course, he uses the DIT to gauge the students' progressions. He acknowledges that there are some legitimate
criticisms about the methodology used by Kohlberg in developing his
scale, including those voiced by the feminists described earlier. Another criticism is that the higher stage that Kohlberg identified is not
representative of a universal morality, but rather of a western libertarian ideal.'55 Notwithstanding these issues, Hartwell maintains that
the methods he employs are effective in teaching moral judgment as
153. In advocating ethical discretion, Professor Simon suggests that the ethical practitioner should simply correct the mistaken understanding of the law-ie, that the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs would bar recovery-and then proceed
with the negotiation. I take it that if the mistake were by the attorney for the
more powerful entity, or if there were reasons to believe that the adversary's conduct was unfair or dishonest, the correction might not be required. See Simon,
supra note 14, at 1991.
154. See Hartwell, Experiential Teaching, supra note 2.
155. Id. at 513 & n.32.
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documented by the students' progressively higher DIT scores. 15 6 He
attempts not to "consciously advocate either Kohlberg or Gilligan, but
instead, ... to support all student responses.. ." in an effort to encourage their growth.15 7 Although Hartwell relies on the DIT to substantiate his effectiveness, and is somewhat critical of methodologies
that are not as specifically grounded, in large measure I am in agreement with his views on the value of Kohlberg's theories. One does not
need to resolve the issue of the correct definition of the progression
and stages of moral development to recognize the need to include
moral judgment in the law school curriculum.
Professor David Richards describes the role of moral conflict or dissonance in triggering the type of discourse that will lead to further
moral development. In an excellent synthesis of the work of various
moral philosophers he explains:
Ethical reasoning depends on certain kinds of cognitive as well as emotional
capacities, including the complex verbal and intellectual skills required to universalize, including the imagination required
to think of oneself (if an agent)
158
as being the others affected by one's act.

Richards describes the teaching method he employs to create this
necessary conflict or dissonance in order to prod his students to examine their own beliefs and the applicable legal and ethical rules
more closely. Richards does not reserve this technique for a specialized course on "Law and Morality"; he uses this discourse method in
his first year course in Criminal Law.159
The process of discourse, as described by Richards and Hartwell
(and others),16o can lead to greater recognition and identification of
issues that impact on moral choice. This process, which is intended to
engage the students in an examination of their legalistic reactions by
asking them to examine the problem from a different role or context, is
not unlike the teaching methods espoused by feminists like Goldfarb
and Noddings.161
There may be an objection to portions of my analysis that seem to
confuse issues of morals and morality with terms such as feelings and
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 527-28.
Id. at 522.
Richards, supra note 2, at 363.
Id. at 371.
Professor Bennett discusses a wonderful excerpt from HUCKLEBERRY FINN where
Huck is struggling with a moral choice. Huck's choice is whether to do what is
"right" and "just"according to both law and the conventional morality of the time
and turn in his friend and companion Jim, who is an escaped slave, or to do what
his emotions tell him to do, which was to protect Jim, an act he believed must be
wicked, since it defied both law and social norms. Bennett describes his discourse
(which leads Huck to protect Jim) as one of advanced moral reasoning. Bennett,
supra note 2, at 56-58. In his analysis of this moral struggle, Bennett describes
Huck's progression through Kohlberg's stages. Id. at 58-60.
161. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.

1996]

ETHICAL NEGOTIATION

emotion. What do feelings and emotions have to do with moral judgment? The writings of Packer, Willging and Dunn, Bennett, Kohlberg,
and many feminists such as Gilligan, Noddings, and others explain
that moral growth depends not merely on cognitive development, but
on the development of social perspectives that unavoidably engage the
emotional. According to Willging and Dunn (quoting in part from
Kohlberg),
[an] indispensable skill which is prerequisite to full moral reasoning is the
development of social perception in the form of "role-taking." Kohlberg measures the progressive development of such skill by examining the level at which
the person sees other people,1 interprets
their thoughts and feelings and sees
62
their role or place in society.

In a quote from Kohlberg, they explain that "the experiences that promote such change have a fairly strong emotional component....
[Ilt is
16 3
...

the emotion that triggers and accompanies rethinking.

In the Richards article cited above, the connection between the
emotional and moral are also obviously acknowledged.164 Of course,

the feminist view of moral development, which includes Care related
interests, necessarily entails the influence of emotions, as the Care
concerns discussed are generally identified with emotions. Thus, the
process of engaging students in the type of discourse that may lead
them to heightened moral development necessarily involves an emotional and feeling component.
There have been numerous efforts, noted particularly in the writings of clinical educators, to integrate an emotional or feeling context
into the development of skills in order to improve those skills. While
these efforts may have started with the agenda of producing more effective practitioners, not more moral practitioners, it is conceivable
that both goals will be attained. For example, Professor Gary Goodpaster has written about his program of interviewing and clinical
training to enhance client counselling skills.165 He has advocated

greater attention to the "emotional and psychological growth" of students in order to enhance their ability and skill in dealing with people
162. See Willging & Dunn, supra note 97, at 316.
163. Id. at 317. In the same vein, M.J. Packer provides an interesting view of moral
conflict in a study of subjects engaged in a game "The Prisoner's Dilemma." After
a lengthy account of various incidents that transpired during several groups' participation in the game, Packer discusses the reactions of the players to conflicts
that arose. These conflicts were perceived by the players to have moral and fairness aspects. One of the conclusions is that the response to conflict of this type is
emotional. The emotional then triggers a more analytic and cognitive process.
M AlTIw J. PAcKER, Tim ST ucruR OF MoRAL ACTON, 135-37 (1985).
164. Richards, supra note 2, at 370-71.
165. Gary S. Goodpaster, The Human Arts of Lawyering: Interviewing and Counseling, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1975).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:752

in law situations.1 66 Although his focus is on enhancing skills, he obviously appreciates the larger ramifications of his work:
The position the law authorizes and often requires lawyers to occupy in the
life-space of a person undergoing a law-related crisis can be psychologically
critical to that person's future .... [Tihe social role of the attorney together
with the emotional, psychological, and legal needs of the client combine to give
the attorney enormous personal power to influence the client's choices regarding the future. Whether or not this power is exercised, the fact that the attorney possesses it means that the client will be affected by what the attorney
does or does not do with this power to influence a client ....
Consequently, while I write principally of skills and techniques of interaction
with others, my ultimate focus is beyond "skill" and "technique," which ring so
calculated and technical. It is on that spirit that goes beyond all techniques,
the open, human and facilitative response of one in a position to help another
who can put that aid to use. 16 7

Professors John Barkai and Virginia Fine have also described a
curriculum designed to provide "empathy training" to law students in
order to improve students' interviewing and counselling techniques.168 Again, the focus is on improving technique and effectiveness rather than on developing moral judgment.16 9 However, the
authors make passing reference to benefits to the profession in terms
of both ethical conduct and public perception.'7 0 The focus in their
article is on the client's feelings rather than those of the attorney. It
seems to me, however, that this type of program represents a recognition of the need for emotion not to be shut out of the lawyering
process.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the conversation cited above between Professor Gilligan and
Professor Menkel-Meadow, the latter spoke of Hilary, an individual in
one of Professor Gilligan's books.171 Her comments about Hilary's
analysis of the moral issue is very much to the point of what I understand to be the process of moral discourse and development discussed
by Bennett, Richards, and others. Hilary is, apparently, conflicted
about what to do when she sees an opposing lawyer fail to use a document properly in order to assist his case. Professor Menkel-Meadow
states:
Hilary is faced with the dilemma of the two voices, of the two ways in which
she has been trained. That ethic of care which is within her prompts her to
see the needs of the other lawyer's client, and some part of her wants to reach
out and help. The more traditional critique of that problem is to point out that
166. Id. at 6-7.
167. Id. at 9-10.
168. John L. Barkai and Virginia 0. Fine, Empathy Trainingfor Lawyers and Law
Students, 13 SW. U. L. REv. 505 (1983).
169. Id. at 506-07.
170. Id. at 510-16.
171. Marcus et al., supra note 6, at 55.
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our legal system suppresses the truth and that Hilary wants the truth to come
out so that a better decision can be reached. But I think Hilary takes it a step
further. It is not just the truth that matters to her. It is the fact that she
experiences some care for the plight of the party on the other side. She is
imprisoned in the role of an advocate who has been told that her role is to be a
zealous advocate for her client and that she would be stepping beyond that
role if she were to reach out and help the party on the other side by either
telling the lawyer about that document or herself submitting the document.... Hilary's account led me to speculate on what our code of ethics as
lawyers might look like if Hilary herself had created it.172

This, in some sense, brings me full circle. The dilemmas that are
inherent in the negotiation process are very like what Hilary was facing. My efforts to teach my students how to resolve these dilemmas,
as described earlier in this Article, have not been wholly satisfactory.
I believe that a more radical transformation in both legal education
and legal ethics will be required if we hope to achieve significant improvements in the ethical standards of the legal profession. I wonder,
with Professor Menkel-Meadow, what the codes of ethics might look
like if Hilary (and Huckleberry Finn) had created them. However, it
seems to me that the problem is that we probably lose our Huckleberry Finns in the process of legal education, and we train our Hilarys
to act like the rest of us, no matter how conflicted they might feel
about their lawyerly conduct.
Like Goldfarb, I believe that the moral judgment that we need to
allow our students to develop can most effectively be taught in context,
and this means in a practice setting like the law school clinic. As
Kohlberg has said "principled moral reasoning is limited to mature
adults who 'have the experience of sustainedresponsibilityfor the welfare of others and the experience of irreversible moral choice which
are the marks of adult personal experience.'"173 I am aware of the
limitations of this approach. Like the limitations noted with respect
to Professional Responsibility courses, the strides that may be made
in clinical teaching are in danger of being more than off-set if the overall curriculum is not responsive to these issues. First of all, clinical
education does not reach all students. Additionally, while students in
clinical courses tend to be very engaged in their learning, there may
be a failure to generalize from the work on a specific category of cases
to an approach in their non-clinical and post-graduation lawyering
processes. To the extent that clinics tend to be offered in public interest and poverty law areas, the moral judgment students learn to exercise there may seem inappropriate or irrelevant to their practice
outside the clinic. With these limitations in mind, I offer the following
observations about certain clinical methods that I believe have value
172. Id.
173. Willging & Dunn, supra note 97, at 318 & n.42, citing Kohlberg. (emphasis is
Kohlberg's).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:752

in promoting the development of moral judgment in students, particularly as applied to the context of negotiating settlement of disputes.
Typically, students enter clinical courses because of a genuine interest in learning what lawyers' work is really like. Consequently,
they invest a great deal of time and thought in their tasks whether
these involve research, writing, analysis, advocacy, or interacting with
others (clients, witnesses, attorneys, and judges). The experiential aspects of both acting in role-as the attorney charged with handling
the case-and role modeling seem to make strong and memorable impressions. Students pattern their behavior on these experiences
whether personal (role-taking) or vicarious (role-modeling).
In teaching students about negotiation I have utilized methods
that I believe contain the elements identified by others as necessary
to, and supportive of, growth of moral judgment.174 What Professor
Richards identifies as cognitive dissonance occurs at several levels.
First, in the seminar discussion of hypothetical problems involving
settlement, scenarios that raise questions of fairness-both as to process and as to outcome-provoke discussion of what the rules of ethics
require and permit.375 The students are then usually able, with some
prompting, to move beyond that discussion to a more aspirational
level-what the rules and practices should look like. As noted previously, I believe the in-class discussion is a necessary and useful step to
elicit attitudes and feelings about moral issues, but is not a good or
reliable indicator of conduct.176
The students' observations of actual settlement negotiations provide the basis for a more difficult and sensitive analysis of the practical problems encountered in putting theory into practice. Because the
students are, by that time, aligned with the attorneys representing
the defendants, they do identify with those needs and interests. At
the same time, however, plaintiffs in these personal injury cases frequently have serious injuries and present sympathetic cases for recovery. The fact that the students are aligned in interest with the
defendant, who is usually operating from a position of power, but are
simultaneously sympathetic to the position of the plaintiff, creates a
tension (often an emotional tension) that makes it difficult for them
either casually to accept the "negotiator as zealous advocate" model or
to endorse a negotiator as an arbiter of justice model. Not surprisingly, they tend to vary their views and acceptance of tactics and out-

174. See Hartwell, Experiential Teaching, supra note 2; Richards, supra note 2; and
discussion supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
175. See discussion supra Part II.B.
176. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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comes depending on the specific factors in each case.1 7 7 In our
discussions we try to identify those factors that influence our attitudes
about the propriety of negotiation conduct. It is often difficult to articulate specific rules of conduct which can be uniformly and satisfactorily applied in each case to produce both a process and an outcome
that is fair to both sides. There are many cases where, for example,
the rule that we need not voluntarily disclose facts and evidence that
are harmful to our client [Hilary's problem] would yield an unfair outcome. This may be because, as in Hilary's case, the attorney for the
plaintiff has done an inadequate job of fact investigation or legal analysis. Where the fairness of the process and result are discordant, we
discuss whether that is personally acceptable, and whether the system
must accept such discord.
The next phase of our negotiation training requires the students to
engage in settlement negotiations in both hypothetical and actual
cases.1 7 8 Frequently, the students are required to role play a settlement discussion in one of their actual cases. This requires that one of
the students working on the case switch sides and represent the opponent. By placing the student in the role of advocate for the opposing
party, I hope to sensitize the student more fully to the justice and fairness issues from that party's perspective. Usually I assign the student
who seems least impressed with the opponent's case to play the role of
her attorney. I am often struck by the vigorousness of the negotiating
that takes place in that exercise.
Others have noted, and I certainly concur in this, that discussions
about the morality of our rules and practices can be useful only in a
supportive and non-judgmental atmosphere.1 7 9 The clinic seminar,
with the low enrollment and strongly developed working relationships, is an appropriate format for discussion involving sometimes intense personal feelings. Students have been systematically
encouraged to express their views and feelings about all aspects of
their clinical experiences, and have come to accept that viewpoints
with which they disagree may, nonetheless, be valid.
Being non-judgmental does not require that one be non-committal.
I believe that it is often important that students understand my views
on issues, particularly difficult issues. I do not believe that it is overbearing or manipulative to be candid in expressing my feelings about
moral issues; indeed, I think it is destructive and manipulative at
177. Although this is, in a sense, what Professor Simon advocates, it is important to
give them the means to do this in a principled, rather than merely an ad hoc
manner. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.

178. According to Willging and Dunn, "[aldult moral development demands substantial attention to the emotional, role-taldng... which in turn require experiences
in ... making nonhypothetical irreversible moral choices." Willging & Dunn,
supra note 97, at 318 (emphasis added).
179. See NODDINGS, supra note 95, at 178-79, 186.
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times not to do so. I strive not to impose my views in a dogmatic manner, although I realize that the inevitable imbalance in power may
cause students to give greater weight to my opinions than to those of
their colleagues. Consequently, I attempt to place my views in a context where opposing views on both ends of a spectrum are also described. For example, my students know that I consider
misrepresentations about evidence, applicable law, or availability of
witnesses to be improper. They also know that a strict application of
the rules of ethics does not necessarily forbid all such misrepresentations. We discuss views by some commentators that might classify
some such misrepresentations as permissible "bluffing" or "puffing." I
do not attempt to persuade them that my ethical choices are the only
correct ones, but I do try to explain why I feel compelled to conduct
myself in a manner that satisfies me.
While there may be risks in revealing my personal ethics, I believe
that there are greater risks in not doing so. I do not want to leave
students with the sense that nothing is right and, consequently, nothing is wrong. I do not want merely to reveal what I perceive to be the
serious deficiencies of the rules of ethics and then offer no means of
resolving ethical issues. I believe that it is essential that students understand that when one makes moral choices, there may be ramifications that one must be prepared to accept. Ultimately, I want them to
understand the concept of professional responsibility in a way that is
different from merely staying within the confines of the rules and
thereby absolving themselves of the consequences of their conduct. I
want them to understand that a professional must be ready to accept
the consequences of her conduct, and must make her decisions based
on an appreciation of what those consequences are likely to be.
In conclusion, I believe that it is clear that legal educators must
take responsibility for the moral content of legal education. Ideally,
this will not be limited to courses in professional responsibility or to
clinical teaching. If we are to avoid giving the students a message
about the marginal importance of moral judgment, we must avoid
marginalizing its place in the curriculum. According to Nel Noddings,
"So long as our critical skills and the exercises presented to develop
them are confined to 'P's and Q's' and 'P implies Q' our schools will
have the absurd appearance of a giant naked emperor. We need to
look with unclouded eyes on what we are doing."18o We need to affirm
our students' sense that law is not just about rules. "[The teacher]
cannot nurture the student intellectually without regard for the ethical ideal unless she is willing to risk producing a monster. . . "13s1 To
better prepare our students to take on the responsibility of the profession and to safeguard the care and justice aspects of the law, we must
180. Id. at 186.
181. Id. at 178-79.
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seek to develop, rather than thwart, their ability to engage in sound
moral reasoning.

